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Abstract:  The question as to whether religion can block economic development and 
institutional change, or is a purely endogenous factor, assumes particular importance today 
because of the rise of Islamist movements and the disappointing economic performances in 
the lands of Islam.  This paper starts from a critical examination of the thesis of Bernard 
Lewis according to which the lack of separation between religion and politics creates 
particular difficulties on the way to modern economic growth in these lands.   It will be 
argued that (1°) Lewis’ thesis conceals the critical fact that, even when political and religious 
functions appear to be merged, religion is the handmaiden rather than the master of politics; 
(2°) the influence of religion increases when the state falls into crisis, owing to its impotence 
or excessive absolutism; (3°) because the Islamic frame of reference provides political rulers 
with a cheap default option when they are contested, they rarely undertake the much-needed 
reforms of the country’s institutions; (4°) this way of escape is all the more attractive to 
contested rulers as Islamist movements, born of the internal situation as well as of the 
international environment, accuse them of un-Islamic behaviour; (5°) as argued by Timur 
Kuran, by creating an “institutional trap”, the legacy of the Islamic classical system also 
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 Of late, we have witnessed a rising preoccupation of economists about the possible 
role of religion (and ethnicity) in fostering or impeding economic development and growth.  
The main picture that emerges from a quick overview of the econometric literature aimed at 
identifying the main determinants of inter-country variations in long-run growth performances 
is the following: the null hypothesis that religious affiliation is uncorrelated with economic 
performances can frequently be rejected (i.e., religion matters), yet the regressions do not 
yield a robust pattern of coefficients with respect to particular religions, Islam included.1  On 
the other hand, El Badawi and Makdisi (2007) have attempted to measure the impact of the 
Arab dummy on political performance measured by the widely quoted Polity IV index (which 
provides ratings of the standards of democracy).  Their conclusion is that the Arab dummy 
has a negative and highly significant effect even after controlling for a host of economic, 
social and historical variables.  However, the Arab dummy ceases to be significant as a stand 
alone effect once it is also interacted with a variable measuring regional conflicts.  The 
coefficient associated with the interaction term is strongly significant and suggests that in the 
Arab world, unlike what is observed in other parts of the world, interstate conflicts and wars 
tend to promote authoritarianism rather than a shift toward democracy.  Religion (whether 
Islam or Christianity prevails) does not account for the lack of Arab democracy.  Conclusions 
                                                
1 For example, La Porta et al. (1997, pp. 336-37) found that countries with more dominant hierarchical 
religions (Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam) “have less efficient judiciaries, greater 
corruption, lower-quality bureaucracies, higher rates of tax evasion, lower rates of participation in 
civic activities and professional associations, a lower level of importance of large firms in the 
economy, inferior infrastructures, and higher inflation” .  The study of Guiso et al. (2003) finds that 
Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus, unlike the Muslims, appear to be favorably disposed toward 
private ownership.  Barro and McCleary (2003) find that Hinduism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and 
Protestantism are negatively associated with per capita income growth relative to Catholicism, while 
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), who use a larger sample, reach the opposite conclusion, that Islam is a 
positive rather than a negative factor for growth.  Such a result is confirmed by Noland (2005) for 
whom the notion that Islam is inimical to growth is not supported by his data.  Still more recently, 
Pryor (2007) comes to the conclusion that the presence of Islam has very little influence on twenty-
three indicators of economic and social performance.  










along the same line have been reached by Noland (2008) and Tessler (2002), yet not by Fish 
(2002).  Also deserving special emphasis is the recent finding by Pryor (2007) that no special 
Islamic economic system can be isolated on the basis of a cluster analysis and data on forty-
four economic institutions used to define economic systems.  Moreover, the share of Muslims 
in the population is unrelated to the presence or absence of most particular economic 
institutions.   
Many economists who believe that cultural explanations are a priori dubious and ad 
hoc ways of accounting for poor growth performances will not be surprised by such an 
agnostic conclusion.  They are prone to emphasize that, since it is possible to pick out specific 
aspects of almost any religion that are antithetical to economic growth, testing the impact of 
religion on economics is bound to be inconclusive (North 2005, 136).  On the other hand, 
estimating the impact of culture on economic and other performances is extremely difficult 
because of the well-known endogeneity problem: rather than blocking development, a 
particular culture may evolve in a nasty direction as a result of a lack of growth.  The 
endogeneity bias is very hard to surmount since it is practically impossible to find variables 
that influence culture without affecting growth performances in one way or another.  Little 
can therefore be learned about causal effects from cross-sectional results.  However another, 
equally serious problem plagues cross-country econometric studies, and it is especially 
evident in the case of the religious component of a cultural endowment.  Owing to the paucity 
of data available, the measurement and aggregation of religious affiliations that form a highly 
delicate part of the whole exercise are typically done in an extremely crude manner.2   
Because of these problems and because the reciprocal effects between culture and 
development carry long time lags, more reliable lessons can presumably be learned from a 
                                                
2 Thus, how do we have to interpret the effect of religion when denominations are aggregated into such 
broad categories as Protestantism or Islam, thereby ignoring the multiple and subtle subdivisions and 
sects into which they have split over the course of their history?  Moreover, two persons who declare 
themselves Christian Catholic or Muslims may mean different things and behave according to 
different interpretations of the religious doctrine invoked. 










historical foray of the issue than from cross-country regressions.   The fruitfulness of the 
historical approach is illustrated in the present paper with specific reference to the case of 
Islam.  Such a choice is justified by the fact that the Arab world has gone through a prolonged 
period of low growth and democracy deficit while witnessing the ominous rise of radical 
Islamist movements.  We are interested in knowing whether and to what extent this 
predicament can be attributed to intrinsic features of Islam and what the origins of the Islamist 
movements are.   
The inquiry below rests on a critical examination of the elegant and attractive thesis 
recently put forward by Bernard Lewis in his book What Went Wrong? (2002).  In a nutshell, 
a specific feature of the Islamic world (the lack of separation between religion and politics) 
creates particular difficulties on the way to modern economic growth (see Section 2).  What is 
argued in the paper is the following: (1°) Lewis’ thesis conceals the critical fact that, even 
when political and religious functions appear to be merged, religion is the handmaiden rather 
than the master of politics; (2°) the influence of religion increases when the state falls into 
crisis, owing to its impotence or excessive absolutism (Section 3); (3°) because no vertical 
chain of command exists that can impose a uniform orthodoxy in the lands of Islam, the 
Islamic frame of reference provides political rulers with a cheap default option when they are 
contested, as a result of which they rarely undertake the much-needed reforms of the 
country’s institutions (Section 4); (4°) this way of escape is all the more attractive to 
contested rulers as Islamist movements, born of the internal situation as well as of the 
international environment, accuse them of un-Islamic behaviour: a serious risk of obscurantist 
deadlock is thereby created; (5°) as argued by Timur Kuran, by creating an “institutional 
trap”, the legacy of the Islamic classical system also makes institutional reforms more 
difficult to achieve (Section 5). 










In conclusion (Section 6), we require a dynamic framework to understand 
satisfactorily the path-dependent trajectory followed by Islamic countries.  For long-term 
progress to be possible, the escape valve of Islamist outbidding ought to be made more costly 
for inadequate rulers.  However, such an outcome can happen only if people are able to 
challenge their leaders with the help of secular-rationalistic systems of ideas, which requires, 
in turn, that behavioural and institutional changes have taken place on the levels of the 
economy and that merchants dare break out of their alliance with religious authorities where it 
has been traditionally strong.  If an “institutional trap” exists, such changes will be especially 
difficult to achieve.  Bringing into the picture the complex interaction and feedback effects 
existing between culture and institutional change enables us to draw an insightful contrast 
between the virtuous development trajectory of Western Europe in modern times and the 
nasty path trodden by the lands of Islam during the same period.   
 
2.  The challenging thesis of Bernard Lewis 
2.1 A background view of Western Europe as successful path-dependent development 
Careful examination of the historical evidence pertaining to Western Europe suggests 
that the relationship between culture and institutions is dialectical and involves feedback 
effects along a complex dynamic path.  Contrary to the well-known thesis of Max Weber 
(1930), for whom the Protestant Reformation was a critical moment conducive to modern 
capitalist growth in Europe, and to the more recent view of Jonathan Israel (2001), for whom 
it is the Early Enlightenment (1680-1750) that played that role, it seems that systems of ideas 
have largely adjusted to changes occurring on the level of the economy and the polity.  It 
would be difficult to explain otherwise how dynamic Catholic merchants could operate in 










prosperous North Italian and Flemish cities even before the advent of Protestantism3  and how 
such important steps as the Petition of Rights (1628), whereby all Englishmen were granted a 
set of rights protected by a law enacted by Parliament, or the abolishing of the Star Chamber 
(1641) and the concomitant ruling requiring that all cases involving property be tried at 
common law courts, or the Glorious Revolution (1688), which initiated the era of 
parliamentary supremacy, implying that the Crown could no longer claim to be above the law, 
could take place so early in the history of modern England (North and Weingast 1989).4   
A valid point can nevertheless be made that by articulating powerful ideas that 
questioned the existing socio-political order (including the old hierarchy of studies) and shook 
the mental world of the west along rationalistic and secular lines, the New Philosophes gave 
an impetus to new economic and political changes that were to have a profound impact on 
contemporary European society.  In other words, Western Europe was placed on a virtuous 
path-dependent trajectory that triggered self-reinforcing modernizing changes on multiple 
levels.  It bears emphasis that ideological and intellectual transformations in Europe were 
much more gradual than usually thought.  In the words of Joseph Schumpeter (1954, pp. 80-
82),  
There is little if anything to the saga of a new light that had flashed upon the world and was 
bitterly fought by the powers of darkness, or of a new spirit of free inquiry that the 
henchmen of hidebound authoritarianism vainly tried to smother… the authority of the 
                                                
3 Migration actually provided a direct link between the presence of entrepreneurship in Catholic and 
Protestant cities.  During the 16th and 17th centuries in the Low Countries, dynamic people, merchants 
in particular, fled from southern areas (Antwerp, most notably) to northern Calvinist-controlled areas 
in order to escape the oppressive climate of the counter-Reformation. Many of these migrants later 
converted to Protestantism.  Rather than being the driving force of capitalism, the rise of Protestantism 
seems to have been induced by emerging capitalist entrepreneurship: dynamic individuals did not 
become merchants or capitalist entrepreneurs because of their (Protestant) beliefs, but instead, they 
adopted a religion that was compatible with their economic aspirations and their interests.  
Interestingly, Tawney (1926) himself was more inclined than Weber to reckon that the Reformation 
stimulated a movement already under way; it is striking that the more highly developed districts were 
those which gave most support to the Reformation, finding its creed more suitable to aggressive and 
progressive ways of life (Higgins 1968, pp. 163-64, Pettegree 2003, p.68). 
4 Maxime Rodinson (1966) correctly points out that “Weber describes substantial features of higher 
rationality existing in Europe only in the modern age, the age when modern capitalism was already 
predominant, so that it is impossible to prove that these features were not created by the economic 
regime they accompany” (quoted from the English translation 2007, p. 157). 










Church was not the absolute bar to free research that it has been made out to be… The 
society of the feudal ages contained all the germs of the society of the capitalist age.  These 
germs developed by slow degrees, each step teaching its lesson and producing another 
increment of capitalist methods and of capitalist ‘spirit’… [Weber] set out to find an 
explanation for a process which sufficient attention to historical detail renders self-
explanatory.5   
 
Moreover, it is too easily forgotten that the Reformation eventually gave rise to 
enormous confessional tensions and an acute competition among rival religious 
denominations or sects, and these actually resulted in an abrupt raising of moral standards 
imposed by austere moralizing creeds and an extension of the sacred into all areas of life.  At 
least, this was true for a minority of enthusiasts, but more tolerant Christians found it difficult 
to resist them openly (Briggs 1999, pp. 174-76, 181, 191; see also Koenigsberger et al. 1989, 
pp. 222-25, 351-54).  English Puritans, or Dutch Protestant soldiers, displayed attitudes of 
moral rigour and intolerance (including rejection of every representation of God in a church, 
and reaction against cults of saints in an attempt to purify the house of God from intrusive 
idols) that were a direct consequence of the Protestants’ paramount objective, namely to 
return to the pristine practice of the primitive Church (Toynbee 1972, pp. 475-76, Strong 
2007).  In some cases these attitudes, which strikingly evoke present-day postures by 
Islamists6, led to the worst forms of persecution as attested by the massacres of Anabaptists in 
Germany and the Netherlands.  In the words of Fernand Braudel (1995, p. 353), “Inaugurated 
under the banner of liberty and revolt, the Reformation soon lapsed into the same degree of 
                                                
5 For Schumpeter, interestingly, the conflict was political in nature: “The laical intellectuals, Catholics 
no less than Protestants, were often opposed to the Church as a political power, and political 
opposition against a church very easily turns into heresy” (p. 82).   
6  “Puritans demanded a new moral discipline, not only of themselves, but of the whole community as 
well.  They were opposed to many folk customs as well as amusements such as May-poles, morris 
dancing, ballad singing and plays.  They wanted a clear line to separate the sacred from the profane, 
calling for an end to Sabbath breaking, elaborate funerals, and the use of churchyards as places for 
public gatherings and festivities… they wanted to stamp out semi-magic rituals…” (Koenigsberger et 
al. 1989, p. 354). 










intransigence of which it accused its enemy.  It built a structure as rigid as medieval 
Catholicism”.7  
Also supporting the idea that changes were slow, especially in the sphere of ideas and 
beliefs, is the “durability of conventional religious beliefs” and the fact that almost all the 
major intellectual figures who contributed to the new philosophical and scientific revolution 
did so “in a distinctly religious spirit” (Briggs 1999, pp. 171, 204).  In the words of Robin 
Briggs: “Religion still provided the framework within which everything was set, so that there 
appeared to be little difficulty in absorbing new intellectual trends within Christian doctrine” 
(p. 205).  Science and religion were not seen as being in direct conflict inasmuch as 
“knowledge of the natural world was also knowledge about the divine purpose” (p. 171; see 
also Collins and Taylor 2006, pp. 155-59).  The understanding of the world in rational, 
analytical and quasi-scientific terms remained the attribute of a small elite until well into the 
19th century, the outlook of the majority remaining traditional and largely rooted in religion 
(Anderson 2003, p. 381).   
What is remarkable in the modern history of the most advanced parts of Western 
Europe, however, is that, although necessarily slow and progressive, the shift towards 
rationalization and secularization was pursued in a more or less continuous and sustained 
manner.  This provides a striking contrast to Russia, for example, where a long autocratic 
political tradition dating back to the to the 15th century (when the Muscovy princes began to 
dominate the country at the expense of the more liberal rulers of Kiev and Novgorod, two 
prosperous cities thriving at the edge of the Western European merchant-capitalist world8) 
                                                
7 Robert Briggs (pp. 182-83) writes in the same vein that, “despite its initial appeal to the laity, 
Protestantism rapidly evolved into a new and highly demanding form of clericalism, whose rigid 
doctrines and intense moralism were ill-suited to win general support”. 
8 See, for example, Pipes (1995, p. 105), Raeff (1984, p. 10), Riasanovsky (1993, pp. 183-95). 










prevented the Enlightenment ideas to strike deep roots, even when they were systematically 
imported during the reign of Catherine the Great.9   
 
2.2 A condensed view of ‘What Went Wrong?’ 
 In the light of the above lessons from the Western European experience, the thesis 
expounded by Bernard Lewis in his New York Times Bestseller What Went Wrong? (2002) 
appears all the more challenging.  What Lewis contends, indeed, is that Islam is a genuine 
obstacle to development and that it differs radically from Christianity.  In other words, 
religion is not necessarily an obstacle to development, but in the specific case of Islam, it 
appears to be so. 
  Lewis’ argument rests on the contention that, in contrast to Christianity, the separation 
between politics and religion, God and Caesar, Church and State, spiritual and temporal 
authority, has never really occurred in the Islamic world.  As a consequence, individual 
freedom, social pluralism, civil society, and representative government were prevented from 
evolving in Muslim societies.  The reason for the lack of separation between the religious and 
the political spheres in the Muslim world is argued to be historical: the Prophet Muhammed 
became the political leader of his own city (Medina), causing a complete merging of religion 
and politics and suppressing any move toward building a religious establishment.  In the 
words of Ali Shari’ati, “the Prophet of Islam was the only one who simultaneously carried the 
sword of Caesar in his hand and the heart of Jesus in his chest” (1986, p. 23, quoted from 
Hassan and Kivimäki 2005, p. 125).  Naturally, the succeeding caliphs held both temporal and 
spiritual powers.   
                                                
9 During the second half of the 18th century, the empress Catherine reinforced her autocratic authority, 
denied the necessity of providing legal guarantees to protect subject people, and passed repressive 
laws (such as the 1765 law that forbade peasants to make complaints against their masters but granted 
to the gentry the right to punish their serfs by exiling them to Siberia) while professing hypocritically 
to adhere to the liberal philosophy of the French Encyclopedists (Walicki 1979, pp. 2-8). 










The first Christians built up a Church structure to defend themselves against a state 
that oppressed them (until Constantine converted to Christianity) and adhered to the principle 
“render unto God that which is God’s and unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s”  According to 
an authoritative voice, the separation between the state and the Church in Western 
Christianity did not seriously start until the Gregorian reforms during the 11th century.  These 
reforms, initially intended to shield the Roman papacy from the political ambitions of the 
German emperor, ended up causing “a genuine separation between the clergy and the laity, 
between God and Caesar, between the pope and the emperor” (Le Goff 2003, p. 86).  The 
critical point is that Muslims had no such need to isolate the religious sphere from the 
political one.  In Islam, there is no ecclesiastical body, nor is there any vertical chain of 
command to direct the believers (except in Iran where the Shi’a tradition prevails and a 
clerical establishment that has been expanded after Khomeini’s revolution exists): Muslim 
believers refer directly to God and its law on earth, the shari’a.  “Since the state was Islamic, 
and was indeed created as an instrument of Islam by its founder, there was no need for any 
separate religious institution.  The state was the church, the church was the state, and God was 
head of both, with the Prophet as his representative on earth… From the beginning, Christians 
were taught, both by precept and practice, to distinguish between God and Caesar and 
between the different duties owed to each of the two.  Muslims received no such instruction” 
(Lewis 2002, pp. 113, 115).   
According to the same logic, there is no such thing as a laity in the lands of Islam: 
 The idea that any group of persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any 
sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim thought.  There 
is, for example, no distinction between canon law and civil law, between the law of the 
church and the law of the state, crucial in Christian history.  There is only a single law, the 
shari’a, accepted by Muslims as of divine origin and regulating all aspects of human life: 
civil, commercial, criminal, constitutional, as well as matters more specifically concerned 
with religion in the limited, Christian sense of the word… One may even say that there is 
no orthodoxy and heresy, if one understands these terms in the Christian sense, as correct 
or incorrect belief defined as such by duly constituted religious authority…Even the major 
division within Islam, between Sunnis and Shi’a, arose over an historical conflict about 










the political leadership of the community, not over any question of doctrine. (Lewis 2002, 
pp. 111-12)  
  
The only vital division in Islam is between sectarian and apostate: “Apostasy was a 
crime as well as a sin, and the apostate was damned both in this world and the next.  His 
crime was treason –desertion and betrayal of the community to which he belonged, and to 
which he owed loyalty.  His life and property were forfeit.  He was a dead limb to be excised” 
(Lewis 1995, p. 229).  For the rest, “The absence of a single, imposed, dogmatic orthodoxy in 
Islam was due not to an omission but to a rejection –the rejection of something that was felt 
by Sunni Muslims to be alien to the genius of their faith and dangerous to the interests of their 
community… The profession of Islam… is that God is one and Muhammad is his Prophet.  
The rest is detail”.  In other words, tolerance must be extended to all those who “reach the 
required minimum of belief”, while intolerance is required toward all those who deny the 
unity or existence of God, the atheists and polytheists ((Lewis, 1995, pp. 229-30). 
The sovereign is just the “shadow of God on earth”, in charge of enforcing yet not 
interpreting the words of God.  There is actually no concept of nation or people in the Islamic 
world, only that of the community of believers (the umma) that transcends physical 
boundaries.  This is best expressed by Hassan Al-Banna (more about him later) when he 
states, “Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life.  It is a country 
and a home or a country and a nation” (Al-Banna 1996, p. 7, quoted from Hassan and 
Kivimäki, p. 127).10 
To sum up, the difference between Christianity and Islam is so radical that it reflects a 
clash of cultures and civilizations: to the Western perception of the separation of religion from 
political life and the assertion of individual rights, the Muslims oppose an all-encompassing 
view of the divine law that implies the amalgamation of religion and politics and the 
                                                
10 It is thus revealing that the Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas has been severely blamed by 
Osama bin Laden and his Al-qaeda movement for having agreed to run for a national election (January 
2006).  Following its victory, Hamas has ruled over a national territory instead of fighting on behalf of 
the whole world Muslim community. 










recognition of collective rights for all the Muslim faithful.  From there, it is just a short step to 
contend that “Islam and democracy are antithetical” since obedience to religious tenets is 
inherent in Islamic religious doctrine (Lewis 1993, p. 91; see also Miller 1993, pp. 45-51, 
Kepel 1994, p. 194, Pipes 1995, p. 192).  As stressed by Karl Marx, a modern market 
economy cannot develop in the absence of a civil society understood as an autonomous sphere 
of economic activity, unimpeded by political and religious restrictions (see Avineri, 1968, pp. 
154-55).  For Lewis, it is precisely this sort of emancipation that is prevented from occurring 
in the lands of Islam.  
 
2.3  A clarification 
From Lewis’ account, it is evident that the distinction between the Muslim and the 
Christian civilizations, or ‘institutional complexes’ (Greif, 2006), dates back to the critical 
moments of the foundation of the faiths: the rise of Christianity within the Roman Empire on 
the one hand, and the rise of Muhammad in a context where he had to construct a political, 
economic and social order on the other hand.  This idea has been forcefully restated by Avner 
Greif who even establishes a parallel between Islam and Judaism in this regard: 
 Because the Roman Empire had a unified code of law and a rather effective legal system, 
Christianity did not have to provide a code of law governing everyday life in creating 
communities of believers.  Christianity developed as a religion of orthodoxy and proper 
beliefs; in earthly matters, Christians followed Roman law and later other secular laws.  … 
Islam rose through a very different process, in which Muhammad established both a 
religion and a political, economic, and social unit.  Islam therefore had to provide, and 
emphasize the obligation of adherents to follow, the Islamic code of law, the Shari’a.  
Like Judaism, therefore, Islam is a religion that regulates its adherents’ behaviour in their 
everyday, economic, political, and social life. (Greif 2006, p. 206, see also Kuran 2004b). 
 
  As Lewis is aware, the behaviour of Muslims could not be governed only by 
reference to texts, however sacred, elaborated during the times of the founder of the faith: the 
shari’a cannot be reduced to the Qur’an.  As a matter of fact, the words of the Qur’an were 
not deemed by Muslim thinkers to be a sufficient guide for an empire stretching from Spain to 










Central Asia, and one of the strengths of Islam during the times of conquest when it came into 
contact with peoples of diverse local cultures and religions was the recognition that different 
manifestations of popular piety would have to be tolerated within the umma.11   
During the period running from the 8th to the 10th centuries, it became increasingly 
recognized that a uniform code of conduct defining what is absolutely true and eternal could 
be devised and enforced only by complementing the Qur’an with three other sources of law 
that would come to form the shari’a.  These supplementary sources were the tradition of the 
Prophet (known as the sunnah), which comprises his sayings and actions (the hadith); analogy 
based on precedents; and the consensus of the community (ijma), as determined by the 
decisions of the ulema who are the jurists-cum-theologians in charge of interpreting the intent 
of God’s revelations and assessing “the legality of the actions of individuals on the basis of 
their compliance with God’s commands”.  The ulema establishment comprises the individuals 
trained in the Islamic law, that is, the scholars who compilated the shari’a, the judges who 
applied it in the Islamic courts (the qadis), the legal experts who advised the judges (the 
muftis), and the teachers who educate the Muslim community (the mudarris) (Cleveland 
2004, pp. 27-28, Gleave and Kermeli 1997).     
The question then arises as to whether the ulema fulfill a function more or less 
equivalent to the ecclesiastical structure in the Christian world where it has the authority to 
enforce uniform interpretation of God’s message.  Admitting such an equivalence would 
obviously undermine Lewis’ argument that, unlike what is observed among Christians, 
Muslim believers directly relate to God and just a ‘minimum of belief’ (to recognize the unity 
or existence of God) is required of them.  The crucial importance of this point will become 
more evident later.  
                                                
11 To some extent, this was also true of Christianity. It is thus easy to find in the rituals of the Catholic 
Church erstwhile pagan customs borrowed from the Celtic culture (feasts, sacred places, sacred 
women figures, etc).  
 










Leaving aside the particular case of Iran,12 Lewis is essentially correct in saying that 
no priesthood exists in the Islamic world, if we mean that there are no human intermediaries 
between the individual believer and God.  At the same time, the ulema were able to provide a 
measure of unity to law and doctrine by codifying and transmitting religious knowledge, and 
they have always exercised substantial control and influence over how Muslims interpret 
Islam.  Moreover, the madrasas, those schools of instruction created in Baghdad in the 11th 
century, helped a great deal to maintain a certain unity in the Islamic scholarly tradition 
(Makdisi 1981, Berkey 1992 and 2007, Kuran 1997, p. 52, Goffman 2002, p. 72, Cleveland 
2004, pp. 28-29).   
Bearing the above qualification in mind, a significant difference exists between Islam 
and Christianity: in spite of the presence of the ulema, Islam leaves a rather ample margin of 
freedom for the interpretation of the Qur’an.  This is because rules tend to be scattered 
throughout the works of the ulema who, moreover, do not form a religious establishment that 
can declare by fiat which is the correct interpretation of the Qur’an, and because no central 
power structure resembling the Vatican (with its ability to excommunicate) has ever existed to 
lead the Muslim world community except for first Caliphate.  Muslim believers, therefore, 
appear to be both more and less constrained than their Christian counterparts.  They are more 
constrained insofar as all aspects of their lives fall under the purview of the shar’ia, yet they 
are less constrained insofar as, in strictly religious matters, they are generally not subject to 
precise and rigid rules. 
Furthermore, Islamic legal practice was defined by a combined interpretation of the 
shari’a law and the classic sources of Islamic jurisprudence, on the one hand, and local 
customary law, on the other hand.  The latter was called when the former failed to provide 
                                                
12 There is ample ground to regard the djomehs imams as abbeys, the hodjatoleslams as bishops, the 
ayatollahs as archbishops, the grand ayatollahs as cardinals, and the marjâya tabligh as a sort of 
patriarch which the khomeynist revolution has tended to transform into a unitary Shi’ite papacy (Adler 
2005, p. 122, footnote).  In fact, all Shi’a sects retain relatively defined clerical hierarchies, and the 
Jaafaris, the dominant branch of Shi’ism, sustain a loosely church-like clergy. 










answers or simply when the ‘law of the land’ prevailed.  By its very nature, Islamic legal 
practice was therefore ‘a cultural hybrid’, and legal service providers had to know local 
cultural norms in addition to Islamic codes (Lydon 2007, p. 19).  This applies especially well 
to the Ottoman state, which drew upon all four schools of Islamic law in its law-making, 
institutionalized various systems of sufism (Islamic mysticism) within its urban communities 
and military organizations, and did not hesitate to use customary law in order to placate its 
disparate population of Christians, Jews, and followers of different schools within Sunni 
Islam (Goffman 2002, p. 73).   
In the lands of Islam, religious dignitaries (e.g., the imams) may indulge in preaching 
and teaching the faithful in the numerous existing madrasas and mosques, and this typically 
means that the messages conveyed can vary considerably from one place to another.  In 
Pakistan, for example, the content of the syllabi differs according to the madrasa, and the 
militant and sectarian teaching is transmitted orally and depends very much on the political 
affiliation and personality of the preacher (Piquard 1999, p. 76).  A major implication can be 
drawn from the foregoing discussion, “the decision to oppose the state on the grounds that it is 
insufficiently Islamic belongs to anyone who wishes to exercise it” (Zakaria 2003, pp. 124-25, 
144), which provides an important link to the main argument developed in the subsequent 
sections of the paper.  Since Muslims can turn to preachers of their own choice, and these 
preachers are not subject to the rigid ruling of a priestly caste acting as the representative of 
God, could not religion be manipulated by politics?  Such possibility is normally precluded in 
Lewis’ scheme of analysis, where states and political authorities appear to be largely 
subsumed or merged into the religious realm.13 
                                                
13 Oddly enough, Lewis points out that, in Islam, religious agents never really succeeded in imposing 
ecclesiastical constraints on political and military rulers.  He also describes as rare the attempts made 
by Muslim sovereigns to bring religion under control (Lewis 2002, pp. 135-36).  One wonders how the 
first statement can be reconciled with his central thesis about the lack of separation between religion 
and politics.  As for the second statement, it is questionable in the light of the evidence adduced below 
that political rulers often succeeded in instrumentalizing religion in the lands of Islam.  Whether this 











3. The role of politics and the instrumentalization of Islam 
3.1 First insights drawn from the early  history of Islam  
A good starting point to explore the relationship between religion and politics in the 
lands of Islam and to illustrate the point that religion is easily manipulated by all political 
actors is the history of the first centuries of Islamic rule.  As attested from the very beginning 
by the murders of three of the four caliphes who succeeded Muhammad, the history of Islam 
is full of violent confrontations between various factions vying for power and adhering to 
different interpretations of the Qur’an, each claiming legitimacy for its own version of 
inheritance from the Prophet.  During the times of Muhammad, there was already continuous 
competition and warfare not only between the merchant dynasties of the cities and the 
Bedouin coming from a rugged desert terrain, but also within each of these groups.  Under the 
first caliph (Abou Bakr), the converts from Medina claimed that political power should be 
made accessible to all Muslims whereas the caliph argued contrariwise that it should remain 
the exclusive preserve of the original group of believers, meaning the members of the 
Quraysh clan (Muhammad’s tribe).14  Under the third caliph (Othman), the best state positions 
were earmarked for his own clan, and the first Ummayyad caliph (who transferred the capital 
city from Mecca to Damascus in 657) won power after having defeated Ali, the fourth caliph 
and the religious Shi’a hero.   
Rather than originating in a doctrinal conflict, Shi’ism thus began as a movement of 
support for the leadership of certain Arab candidates in the caliphate, in opposition to the 
hegemony of Syrian Arab tribes ruling from Damascus.15  A complete dissociation between 
                                                                                                                                                   
amounts to saying that they succeeded in bringing it under control is an open question that is largely 
semantic. 
14 This requirement was to be reasserted in the most famous theoretical exposition and defence of the 
caliphate, that of al-Mawardi (d. 1058) (Hourani 1991, p. 142). 
15 Iraqi Shi’ism (the movement supporting Ali’s descendants who were expected to rule from Kufa in 
Iraq) united with the Khurasani tribes from the Iranian northeastern highlands and with the 










politics and religion ensued, and the function of the caliphate was emptied of all its sacred 
content.  The merchant aristocracy of Mecca, in particular, actively fought against prophetic 
preaching.  For this reason, the seizure of power by the Meccan clan of the Ummayyads may 
be seen as an usurpation.  The Abbasids (from Bagdad), who overthrew the Ummayyads, 
attempted to revitalize the sacred function of the caliphate but did not quite succeed.  As early 
as the middle of the 10th century, the institution declined after less than two centuries of glory 
(see Meddeb 2002, p. 96).   
The central lesson to draw from the above cursory account is the following: what 
appear at first sight as conflicts between various religious factions or interpretations of the 
faith often conceal more down-to-earth struggles between different clans or tribes over access 
to political power and the economic privileges that go with it.  Religion was a legitimizing 
instrument in the hands of established rulers in need of popular support or in those of 
contending political rulers. Initiating a long tradition in which political power is exercised by 
military leaders who dressed themselves as emirs, Baybars, the great Mameluk ruler, used the 
prestigious figure of the caliph to sanctify his own worldly glory, in the same way that 
Friedrich II (1194-1250), a Hohenstaufen, obtained the title of king of Jerusalem to enhance 
his powers in Europe (Meddeb 2002, Chaps 16-17).16  
                                                                                                                                                   
underground Abbasid movement whose claim to rule also originated in Muhammad’s broad tribal 
family.  Upon overthrowing the Ummayyads, the Abbasids pushed away their allies to build a broad 
base of Islamic clerical wisdom (Makiya 1989, p. 213).  As a result, the Abbasid Caliphs coexisted 
with increasing difficulty with the Shi’ite imams (all direct descendants of the Prophet via Fatima and 
of Ali, the fourth caliph) whom they controlled from close quarters and often ended up assassinating.  
The only real attempt at reconciliation occurred when Al Mamoûn allied himself with the progressive 
eighth imam, Ali Reza, and tried to propagate the rationalist doctrine of the Mutazilis (according to 
which truth can be reached by using reason on what is given in the Qur’an) as the official philosophy 
of the state.  He went so far as planning to make Ali Reza his successor.  Following a revolt of part of 
his army in Baghdad, Al Mamoûn was compelled to revise his plan and most likely ordered the 
poisoning of Ali Reza.  As for the Mutazilis thinkers, they gradually ceased to be important within the 
emerging Sunni community, but their influence remained strong in the Shi’ite schools of thought as 
they developed from the 11th century (Adler 2005, p. 110, Hourani 1991, pp. 63-64). 
16 As we shall see later, to assert and to maintain their monopoly over the right to rule, the Ottomans 
also laid claim to several honorary titles that had spiritual significance among the subjects.  










This conclusion fits well with what we know not only about Arab countries, but also 
about other lands of Islam.  The example of Mali is instructive in this regard.  An ambitious 
warlord, Askia Mohamed, became one of the most renowned rulers of the Songhaï Empire.  
To succeed in his military campaigns, he went to Mecca in 1496 and, upon his return, he took 
the title of “Calife of the Soudan”.  Using his new Islamic credentials, he embarked upon a 
jîhad and quickly displaced political contenders (Davidson 1991, p. 106, Milet 2005, pp. 41-
42).  In fact, the history of the Songhai empire of Gao (1528-1591) was one of continuous 
struggle between two political groups, “one with colours that were Songhai, pagan and 
nationalist, and the other proclaiming a Mali-type Muslim universalism” (Fage and Tordoff 
1995, p. 79).17   
In early 17th century, the Massassi, a people of mixed Soninke and Fulani descent, 
“had Muslim clerics in their entourages and, when it suited their interests, acted in Islamic 
ways”,  yet, “their political actions were in no way Islamic; they were concerned with 
converting the clan and age-grade structures of traditional Bambara society into associations 
of serfs and clients subordinate to their will as war-leaders” (Fage and Tordoff 1995, p. 
189).18  Two centuries later, El Hadj Oumar Tall, at the age of 23, went on pilgrimage to 
Mecca and came back with the title of “Calife of the brotherhood Tidjaniya for the Soudan”.  
In the Fouta-Djalon (in today’s Guinea) where he took temporary refuge, he founded a 
zaouïa, which was successful in attracting numerous young Toucouleurs willing to learn the 
new religious doctrine and to embark on a jîhad that ended with the destruction of the Muslim 
                                                
17 The renowned Sunni Ali, who initiated the systematic conquest of their neighbours by the Songhai 
(1464), tended to rely on the support of farmers rather than city dwellers and merchants.  As a result, 
he was “much more a potent force in Songhai traditional religion than a good Muslim” (Davidson, 
1991, p. 105). 
18 This is about the same story as that of the marabouts of the Sine-Saloum (Senegal), who came to 
play in their Mouride sodality the dual roles of religious leaders and dynamic patrons exercising 
authority over highly submissive disciples-cum-clients (the talibé) (Cruise O’Brien 1971 and 1975, 
Boone  1992, pp. 106-9).   










kingdoms of the Khasso and the Masina (Fage and Tordoff 1995, pp. 209-11, Milet 2005, p. 
50). 
 
3.2 The dominant politico-religious equilibrium in the lands of Islam 
  As the preceding account suggests, and opposed to what Lewis contends, political 
rulers tend to have the upper hand in their dealings with religious authorities in the lands of 
Islam.  The principle of non-attachment to worldly affairs seems to have prevailed throughout 
most of the history of these countries.  According to Albert Hourani (1991, pp. 143-45, 458), 
if rulers had to negotiate with the ulema, and if their authority was legitimate only if used to 
maintain the shari’a, and therefore “the fabrics of virtuous and civilized life” (a caliph’s main 
duty was to watch over the faith), a powerful tradition among the ulema (among both the 
Sunni and the Shi’ite Muslims) provided that “they should keep their distance from the rulers 
of the world”.  This implied that they ought to avoid linking themselves too closely with the 
government of the world while preserving their access to the rulers and their influence upon 
them.  Even if the ruler was unjust or impious, “it was generally accepted that he should still 
be obeyed, for any kind of order was better than anarchy”.  Hourani refers to the traditionalist 
and most influential philosopher Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) who wrote that  “the tyranny of a 
sultan for a hundred years causes less damage than one year’s tyranny exercised by the 
subjects against one another”.  Therefore, Hourani comments, “Revolt was justified only 
against a ruler who clearly went against a command of God or His prophet”: anarchy is the 
most abhorred state and, to prevent it from emerging, despotism is justified (p. 144).  Note 
carefully that this tradition developed in spite of the professed aim of Islam to establish a 
righteous world order and to provide guarantees against despotic rule.   
The story of precolonial Morocco, as reported by Mohamed el Mansour (1979), is 
illustrative of the sort of politico-religious equilibrium referred to by Hourani.  The rule of 










Moroccan sultans was generally strong, reflected in authoritarian and centralizing policies.  At 
the heart of the prevailing equilibrium lay an institution called the hurm, a sacred place or 
sanctuary in which everyone living was considered to be holy and all forms of violence were 
prohibited.19  As a shelter for those seeking God’s protection, it was inviolable, implying that 
the sultan’s men could not invest it and any fugitive was immune from pursuit.  Each hurm 
had well-defined limits, was the property of a religious group, and carried a number of 
economic and social privileges (tax exemptions, in particular) in addition to moral benefits. 
The granting by the sultans of considerable privileges to those holding the sanctuaries 
actually reflected a power distribution between the temporal authorities and the religious 
groups.  In some sense, the hurm served as a buffer institution between the central 
government and the various loci of religious power since the sovereign was in no position to 
monopolize religious legitimacy in spite of his special relationship to God under Islam (el 
Mansour, pp. 69-70),  yet cooperation between political rulers and religious authorities and 
groups was the dominant pattern observed in precolonial Morocco.  When the sultan’s power 
was contested and when the use of sheer force was rather ineffective in curbing rebellious 
movements (such as in his relations with the powerful urban community of Fez), the sultan 
co-opted the local religious elite and granted them privileges in the form of donations, tax 
exemptions, decrees of distinction, land grants, and the right of sanctuary. Potential opponents 
were thus confined to the religious field and persuaded that “spiritual leadership of the 
universe was more important than worldly dynastic rule” (el Mansour, pp. 58, 61-62). 
Revealing the sultans’ lack of absolute power is the following fact: the gradual erosion 
of the hurm privileges during the 19th century was made possible only because (reformist) 
ulema themselves decided to attack popular religion as practiced by the zawiya and the 
religious brotherhoods, and thereby played a significant role in delegitimizing the hurm 
                                                
19 The idea of sanctuary is as old as religious belief itself, and it was certainly an integral feature of 
Semitic religious tradition (el Mansour, p. 50).  










institution.  Sultans then succeeded in obtaining fatwas from the ulema authorizing them to 
invade the territory of a hurm with a view to arresting a mutinous governor, on the grounds 
that he was using it as a means to transgress the divine law (el Mansour, pp. 65-67). 
 
3.3 Politics and religion under a state crisis caused by lawlessness 
  The relationship described above between politics and religion could be deeply 
disturbed when the state fell into a state of prolonged crisis.  This typically happened under 
the two polar circumstances of lawlessness and unrestrained despotism: (i) a political vacuum 
created by weak central power, or (ii) a despotic rule resulting in acute people’s oppression 
and deeply entrenched corruption of the leadership.  Under such circumstances, there is a 
tendency for religious authorities and groups to play a more active role in politics and to 
reassert themselves as the most effective shield against the vicissitudes of power.  Let us 
consider the two situations in turn. 
In periods of a power vacuum, contending political factions vie for political power 
causing a state of anarchy and lawlessness under which people endure many hardships.  
Religious figureheads are then tempted to come out of their seclusion in order to substitute for 
missing central power or to help people in distress.  To return to our Moroccan example, it is 
a well-substantiated fact that in periods of political vacuum, sanctuaries became more 
numerous and were more frequently solicited.  This is not surprising since in an environment 
characterized by instability and violence, they became more useful both as islands of peace 
and as sites through which conflicting tribes and other social groups were able to work out 
non-violent solutions (el Mansour p. 57, pp. 69-70).     
In Ottoman Turkey, a state in which the sultan held considerable powers and 
succeeded in incorporating the entire (religious) legal community into the state bureaucracy 










after the 15th century20, his control over the ulema tended to decline during periods of state 
crisis.  Thus, dervish orders were spawned by the chaos of cultural and physical frontiers that 
accompanied the waves of Turkoman migrations.  These fraternities, which existed “in 
bewildering variety”, could represent “exceptional sensibility to political and social 
injustices” (Goffman, pp. 73-74).  They came to form an extensive network of deviant Sufis, 
occasionally operating as centres of opposition to the Ottoman state and its policies.  When 
the regime was fragile, such as was certainly the case under Mehmed I, they could even 
gather a wide range of disgruntled Ottoman subjects into a massive rebellion (1416) 
(Goffman, p. 75).   
The case of Iran (“Persia” prior to 1935) is equally interesting, and deserves special 
attention in the light of the comparatively large influence exerted by the religious authorities 
in recent times,  up to the present.  While the Safavids largely succeeded in making religion 
subservient to their own ends and in building a strong and centralized state that created 
political stability and economic prosperity, the situation radically changed after their demise 
as a result of the rebellion of an Afghan chieftain in 1722 (Algar 1969, Keddie 1969, 1971, 
and 1999, Abrahamian 1982, Arjomand 1984, Floor 2000, Cleveland 2004, pp. 51-55 and 
109-116, Martin 2005, Gleave 2005).  There followed a long period of chaos dominated by 
tribal warfare and weak, short-lived states until the Qâjar dynasty was eventually consolidated 
(1794) to remain (nominally) in power until the 1920s.  The Qâjars, however, “never 
succeeded in recreating the royal absolutism or the bureaucratic centralism of the Safavids” 
(Cleveland, p. 55).  In actuality, powerful centrifugal forces had taken root in Iran during 
almost the whole 18th century, and the Qâjar shahs were never able to mobilize sufficient 
resources to bring them under control.  Administrative instability, insecurity and low 
legitimacy were the hallmarks of most of their rule. 
                                                
20 In the words of Cleveland, “the entire religious establishment held office at the pleasure of the 
sultan” (p. 48; see also Inalcik 1973, Inalcik and Quataert 1994, Goffman 2002, Imber 2002).     










Of more direct relevance to us is the rise to prominence of the Shi’a religious 
establishment during those chaotic times.  The ulema began to function independently of the 
government and, backed by a population that granted them extensive authority in religious 
and legal matters, they constituted a powerful force of support of, or opposition to, the 
policies of the shahs.  According to William Cleveland, popular belief held that the rulings of 
mujtahids (learned individuals qualified to exercise ijtihad, that is, to interpret the shar’ia) 
were more authoritative statements of the will of the Hidden Imam than the proclamations of 
the shahs who made no claims to divinity.  Thus, “if a mujtahid denounced a royal decree as 
incompatible with the teachings of Islam, then believers were enjoined to accept the 
mujtahid’s decision.  In this way, the ulema gained a powerful voice in Iranian political life” 
(p. 111).21  The growing importance of religious courts (the shar’) was reflected not only in 
their rising number, but also in their rather wide area of competence (they could deal with 
commercial and many other matters), and in the preference given by many people to religious 
over official courts (when the choice was possible) whose judges were considered particularly 
corrupt and unreliable (Floor 1980, Gleave 2005).   
Worthy of special attention is the strong alliance that gradually developed between the 
merchants and the ulema.  Resistance against inept and corrupt political rulers in Tehran and 
against unfair accommodation of European economic interests actually united these two 
classes of the population.  The first great popular demonstration, known as the Tobacco 
Protest, was directed against a particularly unjust concession granted to foreign interests 
(Keddie 1966, Rodinson 1966, p. 166, Cleveland 2004, Gleave 2005).22    Significantly, the 
                                                
21 An intense debate took place between the Akhbari and the Usuli schools regarding the role of the 
ulema.  Whereas for adherents of the former, Muslim believers are quite able themselves to interpret 
the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet, adherents of the latter think that only the ulema are 
qualified for that purpose.  In the course of the 18th century, the Usuli school won a decisive victory 
over the Akhbari school.  
22 In 1890, the corrupt and inefficient government of Nasir al-Din who wanted to open Iran to foreign 
economic exploitation awarded a British capitalist (G.F. Talbot) the exclusive right to produce, sell 










mass protests were organized and led by members of the Shi’a ulema who “urged the 
population to join them in preserving the dignity of Islam in the face of growing foreign 
influences; they portrayed the shah’s concession as a transgression of the laws of Islam and 
used their independent power base to denounce the government” (Cleveland, p. 115).  In 
1891, a mujtahid from Shiraz issued a decree (fatwa) declaring tobacco consumption as an 
impious act (an offence to the Hidden Imam) that will be considered as unlawful till the 
cancellation of the concession.  The Iranian people responded by boycotting all tobacco 
products, and after huge demonstrations in Tehran and other important cities, the government 
was forced to backtrack in 1892.  Considerably weakened by this event, it completely 
reversed its policy and became openly hostile to contact with the West.  The essential lesson 
to draw from this example is that a religious authority could use its power of interpretation 
(ijtihad) to confront a government’s economic policy.  To the class of the ulema, it had 
become clear that “the Iranian people were receptive to calls for political activity based on 
Islamic frames of reference” (Cleveland, p. 115). 
Frequent abuses committed by government agents thus largely explains why Iranian 
merchants continuously sought the protection of a conservative religious class and refrained 
from demanding serious reforms.  Only at the beginning of the 20th century did some of them 
actually dare to provide funding to reform movements (Keddie 1999).  On the other hand, a 
crucial factor behind the independence of the religious establishment from the central 
government lay in its financial autonomy.  This is partly the consequence of the fact that in 
Shi’a Islam the ulema rather than the temporal authority are entitled to receive the charitable 
donations Muslims must pay (the zakat).  In addition, the ulema received income from 
teaching, administering waqfs (Muslim charitable institutions)23, registering deeds and titles, 
                                                                                                                                                   
and export the country’s entire tobacco crop.  Since tobacco was such a vital commodity in the 
economy, this decision immediately aroused tumultuous mass protests. 
23 More precisely, a waqf consists of a private immovable property turned into an endowment intended to 
support any social service permissible under the Islamic law (Kuran 2004b, p. 75). 










and maintaining mutually advantageous ties with urban merchants.  Since these incomes were 
largely used to provide educational services and social assistance to the needy, the influence 
and popularity of the ulema were growing: their image as the true protectors of the people was 
all the more attractive as the government was increasingly viewed as corrupt and impious 
(Cleveland, p. 113).24 
 
3.4 Politics and religion under a state crisis caused by unrestrained despotism 
 Pre-colonial Morocco and Safavid Persia were characterized by a politico-religious 
equilibrium in which a powerful ruler had the upper hand and a religious institution played the 
role of a buffer against his potential abuses and of a mediation mechanism through which 
political conflicts could be resolved.  By tolerating such an institution and respecting its 
autonomy, the ruler thus committed himself to moderating his actions and negotiating with 
political opponents rather than crushing them.  Note that this equilibrium is different from the 
political equilibrium of representative democracy in which the buffer, instead of consisting of 
a shelter, a refuge or an asylum, takes on the form of a body, the parliament, endowed with 
genuine decision-making powers in critical matters.  
In the end, it is the legitimacy of the Islamic faith in the people’s eyes that confers 
credibility upon a strong ruler’s promise of moderation: in the absence of it, he could always 
choose to invade the sacred sites (a sanctuary or a mosque) whenever it suited his purpose.  
The importance of religious beliefs is, therefore, the answer to Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
question as to why institutions, in this case, religious institutions, provide commitment (2006, 
p. 177-79).  The politico-religious equilibrium thus obtained is nonetheless more inherently 
unstable than what might appear at first sight.  Using his double quality as both a political 
                                                
24 Thanks to their financial independence, stresses Ayatollah Motahhari, the ulema are able not only to 
respond to the demands of the people, but also “to stand up to governments and fight against their 
excesses and their cruelty” (Rahnema and Nomani 1990, p. 46). 










leader and the guardian of the faith, the ruler may be tempted to confer upon himself the 
legitimacy accorded by Islam with a view to getting rid of countervailing powers, institutional 
buffers, and political dissent.  True, to acquire sufficient religious credentials, he needs to 
secure the cooperation of at least some prominent ulema (as in the aforementioned case, 
where Moroccan sultans strove to undermine the privileges of the sanctuaries), but this may 
not be too difficult given the absence of a strictly uniform interpretation of the Islamic law.  
Obviously, as demonstrated by Egypt (under Mubarak) and the Saudi royal family, the more 
divided the religious class, the easier for the political ruler to have his own way without 
incurring the risk of having to contend with significant religious forces.  
An obvious instance of such a concentration of religious and political powers occurs 
when an ambitious ruler uses the banner of Islam to extend his control over a rebellious 
territory, or to unify a fragmented political space.  For example, when Timur (1336-1405), 
known as Timur Lane or Tamburlaine, began to reconquer the old Mongol territory, he not 
only claimed Mongol descent, but also developed a bigoted version of Islam that bore little 
relation to the conservative party of the ulema: “he saw himself as the scourge of Allah, sent 
to punish the Muslim emirs for their unjust practices” (Armstrong 2001, p. 91).  On the other 
hand, the first (internationally recognized) king of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman (1880), 
worried about the threats to his central power coming from the main tribes of the country and 
constantly referred to Islam as a way to establish his authority.  In order to pacify the northern 
opposition and to extend his authority to the east and the centre, he even decided that he was 
the only person allowed to declare the jîhad (Nahavandi 1999, p. 89).  Motivated by the desire 
to establish central law and order in the country, rulers from Kabul have always tried to use 
the shari’a as a substitute for a variety of tribal laws.  
Rahman was thus following the route pointed to a long time ago by Ibn Hanbal, the 
first Islamist thinker and the founder of one of the four juridical schools of Sunnite Islam (first 










quarter of the 9th century), who reflected upon the best ways to avoid the violent upheavals 
and murderous tribal rivalries that Islam had witnessed during its first centuries (see above).  
Unlike those who argued for a retreat from the ugly realities of world politics through some 
form of mysticism or theological quietism (particularly prominent among the oppressed 
Shi’ites who took refuge in Messianistic expectations, the New Messiah or Hidden Imam 
being supposed to reincarnate Ali)25, Hanbal stressed the need to follow the letter rather than 
the spirit of the Qur’an.  To reconcile the contending factions and reach a large consensus 
among the Muslims, he proposed to ban all personal opinions and to rally the whole 
community of believers around a unique truth.  Reading of the Qur’an had to be literal, 
avoiding any allegorical exegesis.  Indeed, strict adherence to the Islamic law had to replace 
particularized adherence to tribal laws so that segmented ties based on kinship could give rise 
to harmonious relationships grounded in a religion of universal brotherhood.  
Several centuries later, Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) from Damascus and one of the 
foremost religious writers of the Mamluk period followed in Hanbal’s footsteps.  Like him, he 
was preoccupied by the divisions within the Islamic world and believed that the unity of the 
umma (a unity of belief in God and acceptance of the Prophet’s message) is what matters 
most, even if this principle does not imply political unity.  His views were even more radical 
than those of Hanbal, in part because he believed that an important duty of the sovereign is to 
disseminate the Muslim faith beyond the confines of the existing Muslim community and to 
have recourse to the jîhad, the holy war, toward that purpose.  In short, every Muslim believer 
must be a fighter for his faith, and the holy war is as important as prayer in his conception 
(Hourani 1991, pp. 179-81, Meddeb 2002, Chap. 9).26   
                                                
25  This is a reaction similar to that of the Pharisees under the Roman Empire. 
26 For Taymiyya, two pitfalls must be avoided: that of a prince who does not use his wealth, army and 
power to strengthen religion (the way of Christianity), and that of a powerless religion that is deprived 
of financial and monetary resources. 










Even when a country is politically integrated, instrumentalization of Islam may be an 
attractive option for contested rulers willing to suppress dissent and establish an autocratic 
system rid of all genuine countervailing powers or buffers.  To some extent, such a possibility 
reminds us of the political situation that prevailed in the period preceding the formation of the 
Islamic law and the establishment of the legal community when rulers were very autocratic, 
such as was observed during most of the rule of the Umayyads and the early Abbasids 
(Cosgel et al. 2007, p. 18).   
What needs to be emphasized is that in these circumstances the growing role of 
religion is the outcome of a deliberate strategy of the political ruler.  Recent history actually 
offers us many striking examples to the effect that cynical political rulers, often with a secular 
background, use Islam as a readily available ideology and instrument of legitimacy to deflect 
criticisms and entrench their power and privileges.  They are thus able to escape the 
consequences of their misrule and to avoid the hard task of trying to understand the causes of 
their country’s predicament and undertake the necessary reforms, or else quit power.  When 
political opposition takes on the form of Islamist movements that question the legitimacy of 
the ruler on religious grounds, such as is observed when secular-rationalist ideologies remain 
weak, the above strategy that allows rulers to use Islam as a counter-attack device appears to 
be the most cost-effective. 
 In Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (executed in 1977) had been a modern secular 
politician with social democratic ideas, yet as a prime minister and out of political expediency 
“he increasingly appealed to Islam and advocated the Islamization of the country” (Nomani 
and Rahnema 1994, p. 121).27  The move was pursued by General Zia ul-Haq; to consolidate 
                                                
27  The idea of creating a separate Indian Muslim state was first put forward by Sir Mohammed Iqbal 
(1876-1938) in 1930.  If we follow the account given by Naipaul (1982, pp.  88-90), characterization 
of the difference between Christianity and Islam in the thought of Iqbal is very close to the account 
given by Bernard Lewis.  Unlike what is observed in Christianity, religion for a Muslim is not a matter 
of private conscience or practice.  There never was a specifically Christian polity, and in Europe after 
Luther, the “universal ethics of Jesus” was “displaced by national systems of ethics and polity”.  In 










his power and restore the legitimacy of the military after the humiliating defeat of the army in 
the 1971 war against India and the secession of Bangladesh, he chose to present the military 
as “the ideological vanguard of an Islamic state”, and did not hesitate to declare “that he was 
not responsible to anyone except Allah” (Nomani and Rahnema 1994, pp. 126-29).  After 
proclaiming himself president of Pakistan (September 1978), he vowed to bring the economy, 
judiciary, and education further in line with the shari’a and announced the enforcement of 
Islamic penal laws, introduced the Islamic tax, and created Islamic banks.  With the aid of 
Saudi financiers and functionaries, he established numerous madrasas throughout the country 
and thus helped to create a base from which the Taliban government could later develop.  
Interestingly, the ulema played a very minor role in the Islamization of Pakistan (Zakaria 
2003, pp. 145-46, Piquard 1999). 
In Sudan, which was established as a secular state by the 1973 constitution, Gaafar 
Numeiri initiated a rapprochement with Islamic factions as soon as his deeply corrupt 
patrimonial policies aroused bitter political opposition in both the north and the south of the 
country.  Two prominent Islamic politicians, including Hassan al-Turabi (leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and founder of the National Islamic Front whom he had previously 
imprisoned), entered his government in 1977.  Appointed attorney-general, Turabi exerted 
steady pressure for the Islamic reform of the legal system, and in 1983, Numeiri completely 
reversed his previous policy by declaring an ‘Islamic revolution’ and transforming the 
Sudanese state in an Islamic republic to be governed by Islamic law.  He even attempted, 
albeit unsuccessfully, to proclaim himself as Imam accountable only to Allah.  Moreover, he 
demanded an oath of unconditional allegiance from all members of the civil service and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Islam, there cannot be a Luther because there is no Islamic church order for a Muslim to revolt against.  
Muslims, to be true to Islam, need a Muslim polity, a Muslim state in which to enforce their religious 
ideal.  This ideal, indeed, is organically related to the social order that corresponds to it so that the 
rejection of the latter will eventually lead to the rejection of the former (pp. 88-89).  What needs to be 
emphasized, however, is that the political founder of Pakistan, Ali Jinnah, was driven by secular 
ambitions and only wanted a state where Muslims would not be swamped by non-Muslims (p. 90).   










judiciary, thereby causing the departure of prominent secularists and the dominance of the 
civil service, the army and the financial sector by Islamists.   
He also let Turabi draft the Criminal Bill (presented to parliament in 1988) which 
included an ominous provision for outlawing apostasy sufficiently vague to allow its 
application to be politically determined (de Waal 1997, pp. 88, 91, Meredith 2005, pp. 356-
57).  Numeiri’s execution of Mahmud Muhammad Taha, the founder of the Republican 
Brothers, on the charge of apostasy (1984) offers a perfect illustration of the cynical use that 
can be made of the Bill.  The fact is that “opposition to an Islamic government can be, and has 
been, defined as an act of apostasy”, not only against secular Muslims and other political 
opponents (e.g., communists) but also in the harassment of other Islamic sects (such as the 
Khatmiyya, Ansar and Ansar-Sunna) that were regarded as a threat to the ruling power 
(Johnson 2003, p. 129).28  Omer el Bashir, did not depart from the line adopted by his 
predecessor.  In particular, he promulgated the Sudanese Penal Code of 1991, which included 
the aforementioned provision on the crime of apostasy,29 and he made training in Islam 
compulsory for civil servants, teachers, students and higher-education candidates. (de Waal 
1997, p. 98, Johnson 2003, p. 128, Meredith 2005, p. 589). 
The case of Algeria deserves special attention because there the radical Islamist 
movement known as the FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) has actually been encouraged by 
President Boumediene when his hold on political power was seriously challenged in 1968 by 
a rising opposition made up of intellectuals, students and trade unions.  As early as 1965, on 
the occasion of the state coup that brought him to power, a bizarre alliance was sealed 
between the new socialist, anti-imperialist regime and the ulema, granting to the latter the 
                                                
28 That the indictment of apostasy can be turned against Islamic people is also attested by the attitude 
recently displayed by ultra-puritan Sunnis, known as takfiris, whose belief in Shi’a perfidy prompted 
them to denounce the Shi’as as apostates from Islam and to claim that it is therefore legal to kill them 
(Economist 2006a, p. 22). 
29 In addition, a presidential decree in 1991 limited women’s activities and imposed upon them strict 
dressing codes to be enforced by the Guardians of Morality and Advocates of the Good (Meredith 
2005, p. 589). 










right to lead the arabization of the country and to manage the education system (including the 
right to rewrite the school textbooks).  It is thus in complete agreement with the regime that 
the religious dignitaries started to spread the message of a conservative Islam through the 
creation of a wide network of Islamist institutes directly governed by the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs.  Radical views inspired by Taymiyya, Qutb and Mâwdudi (more will be 
said about them later) were diffused legally, and an idea which gained increasing currency is 
that colonization of Algeria had been possible only because of the degeneration of the pre-
colonial state.  The solution had to rest on a return to the sources of Islamic culture 
(Bouamama 2000, Chap. 3). 
When secular, democratic opposition intensified, the regime gave more leeway to the 
ulemas and to the more reactionary forces among them.  They started to assert their authority 
more aggressively and to meddle openly in matters of social policy (such as dressing codes, 
amount of brideprices, etc.).  The idea of a “renaissance” of the country based on the Islamic 
tradition was explicitly taken over by the government30, and the Islamic character of the 
Algerian state, embedded most explicitly into the National Charter, was considered as the 
ideological and political programme of revolutionary Algeria:31 
The Algerian people are an Arab and Muslim people.  Islam is the religion of the state, and 
one of the fundamental components of the national Algerian personality…  It is to Islam, the 
religion of militant endeavour, of rigour, justice and equality, that the Algerian people 
returned to in the darkest times of the Crusades and colonial domination, and it is from 
Islam that they drew the moral force and spiritual energy required to sustain hope and 
achieve eventual victory.  Islam has shaped the Algerian society and made it a coherent 
force, attached to the same land, the same beliefs and the same Arab language that enabled 
Algeria to start again contributing to the works of civilization. (quoted from Bouamama, p. 
161, my translation). 
 
                                                
30 Thus, the Minister of Information and Culture, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, declared that “a cultural 
revolution implies a return to the sources” and that Islam represented the central value upon which to 
build the new Algerian society: “the other values owe their importance, their existence and their 
prestige only to their articulation with Islam or to the fact that they are inspired by or subordinated to 
Islam” (cited from Bouamama, p. 163). 
31 It is revealing that this passage of the 1976 version of the charter was not amended in 1986 when the 
so-called liberal regime of President Chadli decided to revise it, mainly to suppress all references to 
socialism (Bouamama, pp. 161-62). 










 In Algeria, therefore, Islam was “nationalized” and cynically used by the state to 
legitimize repressive policies and mobilization (Layachi 1995, p. 180, Owen, 1992 p. 41).  
This is the usual story of authoritarian rulers who do not hesitate to (discreetly) support or co-
opt extremist movements, whose ideological platform is often based on religion or ethnicity, 
to fight political opponents threatening them.  Power elites used Islam and the language of 
religion in self-defence against opposition groups that were frustrated at the failures of 
corrupt, secretive, authoritarian, and ineffective states that did not deliver on what they 
promised (Hourani, pp. 452-53).32  They were particularly vulnerable to attacks coming from 
Islamist movements since, in the lands of Islam, anyone can oppose the state on the grounds 
that it is insufficiently Islamic (see above): Islamist clerics may decide that a ruler is not a 
‘good Muslim’ and does not deserve to rule.  This largely explains why secular regimes, 
including that of Egypt, began to rest their legitimacy in religion (Hourani, p. 452).33  The 
same principle applies to the secular regimes of Syria and Iraq (Hourani, pp. 452-53).  In Iraq, 
Baathist ideology was based on pan-Arabism “whose spirit is Islam” (Makiya 1989, p. 198).  
                                                
32 The support given by powerful segments of society to governments has very often been passive in 
Arab countries, partly because they did not participate actively in the making of decisions.  “In most 
regimes this was done at a high level by a small group, and the results were not communicated widely; 
there was a tendency for rulers, as they settled into power, to become more secretive and withdrawn 
−guarded by their security services and surrounded by intimates and officials who controlled access to 
them− and to emerge only rarely to give a formal explanation and justification of their actions to a 
docile audience.  Beneath this reason for the distance between government and society, however, there 
lay another one: the weakness of the conviction which bound them to each other” (Hourani, p. 454). 
33 Malaysia attests to the continuing risk of political instrumentalization of Islam, even in 
comparatively developed Asian countries.  There, indeed, resentment among Malays against the 
economically successful Chinese community took the form of an appeal to Islam (unlike the Chinese, 
Malays are Muslims) and a claim for establishing an Islamic state in the country.  If this outcome was 
eventually avoided, it is because a political compromise could be found whereby, at the urging of the 
dominant (non-Islamist) party in power, the Chinese agreed to support a policy of positive 
discrimination in favour of the Malays (Horowitz 1985, Matthew 1990).  This delicate balance seems 
to have been recently disturbed, as attested by the inflammatory speeches at the annual congress of the 
ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in mid-November 2006.  In these speeches, 
indeed, the necessity to defend the race and religion of the Malay Muslim majority against the ethnic 
Chinese and Indian minorities has been overly stressed, and no less than the education minister 
brandished a keris (traditional dagger), only to be asked by another delegate to start using it 
(Economist 2006b, pp. 57-58).  
 










It stressed the exceptionalism of the Arabs whose national awakening was bound up with a 
religious message and obligation (Makiya, p. 211, Dawisha 1999). 
 As is evident from the above accounts, radical interpretations of Islam may be 
encouraged by political rulers eager to suppress dissent and achieve absolute power.  
Radicalization then occurs as a movement born of the spontaneous articulation of popular 
discontent to which the political elite then respond by themselves using Islam as a counter-
attack tactic or as a movement stimulated from above in order to quash opposition.  When 
both opposition groups and the state thus invoke Islam as the main justification for their 
actions, an obscurantist deadlock is created in which all political opinions and judgements 
have to be expressed in the language of religion.  Rather than a merging of religion and 
politics, the problem appears to be the easy manipulation of religion by the state. 
 To understand the emergence of Islamist movements in present-day Islamic world, it 
is not enough to cite the inept and corrupt character of most prevailing political regimes, as 
well as the cynical manipulation of religion by some despotic rulers.  A conjunction of 
historical circumstances, political or military events, and power games at the international 
level have obviously complicated the task of Middle Eastern countries confronted with the 
challenge of modernization and economic progress in the face of powerful external 
competition.  This international context is highlighted in Section 4 below.   
Afterwards, the natural question to be asked is why changes in institutions, norms and 
behavioural patterns did not take place in the lands of Islam to allow them to compete 
effectively with the fast-growing countries of the leading core of the world.  Part of the 
answer has been provided in the above analysis: in the Middle East, the cost and risk of 
reforming institutions are particularly high because of the easiness with which Islam can be 
opportunistically invoked to block movement toward progress, not because of any 
intrinsically retrograde aspect of the faith, but rather because of the absence of a religious 










hierarchy able to impose an Islamic orthodoxy.  In the words of Zakaria, “The Muslim caliph 
was first and foremost a prince; he was not a pope, and he did not have to contend with one… 
rulers could always find some priest to legitimate them, and rebels could find inspiration in 
the words of others” (p. 147).  In the Christian world, instrumentalization of religion by 
political rulers also occurred, yet the presence of a strong Church structure responsible for 
enforcing a uniform interpretation of the faith had the effect of limiting the powers of both the 
rulers and their contenders to manipulate doctrinal tenets at will.   
There is another reason why the cost of institutional reforms (including reforms of the 
political system) has been comparatively high in the lands of Islam in modern times.  As 
argued by Timur Kuran, reforms in a number of key areas are especially hard to achieve 
because they would run counter to the legacy of the classical Islamic system, hence the 
existence of an “institutional trap” impeding modernization of Middle Eastern countries.  The 
diffusion of modern ideologies grounded in secularist and rationalistic worldviews is thereby 
made more difficult.  Kuran’s approach is presented and discussed in Section 5. 
 
4. The rise of Islamist movements 
4.1 Revived Islamist doctrines and unique diffusion opportunities  
Guiding present-day Islamist movements is the thinking of a few religious reformers 
who drew inspiration from the writings of both Hanbal and Taymiyya.  The first of them is 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) who preached the return to the teaching of 
Islam as understood by the followers of Hanbal in the context of central Arabia in the early 
eighteenth century.  This meant strict obedience to the Qur’an and Hadith as they were 
interpreted by responsible scholars in each generation, and rejection of all that could be 
regarded as illegitimate innovations, including reverence to dead saints as intercessors with 
God and the special devotion of the Sufi orders (Hourani, pp. 257-58).  To preserve his creed, 










the Wahhabite does not hesitate to destroy the relics of the past so that any confrontation 
between myth and historical document can be avoided.   
The movement created by al-Wahhab was not important in his own time (he was 
actually a poor philosopher, not well regarded by Arab colleagues), but was to have wider 
significance later.  This is because he was linked to the Seoud tribe, which was striving to take 
hold of power by conquering the Arabian deserts.  The eventual conquest of Arabia by the 
Seouds and their support given to the puritanical doctrine of al-Wahhab proved to be a 
decisive factor in modern Muslim history.34  Much in the line of what has been said before 
about political instrumentalization of Islam, the Saudi royal family is essentially a secular 
polity that has co-opted a religious elite and used Islam in order to consolidate a Saudi 
national identity and thereby reinforce its own legitimacy (Al-Rasheed 1996, 2002, and 2006, 
Nevo 1998).  Abdelwahab Meddeb portrays them crudely as a bunch of hard-nose 
businessmen (more exactly, rentiers) eager to provide an Islamic façade behind which to hide 
their unrestrained capitalist practices (2002, p. 125).  In the context of the present discussion, 
the key point is that the wealth of Saudi Arabia, thanks to the abundance of oil in its soil, 
allowed it to play a major role in the lands of Islam.  Many Muslims migrated to Saudi Arabia 
to work as migrants and later returned to their country of origin, while the government of 
Saudi Arabia used its immense financial resources to disseminate Wahhabism throughout the 
Muslim world and beyond.   
About two centuries after al-Wahhab, the puritanical interpretation of Islam was 
revived by Abû al-A’lâ Mawdûdi (1903-1979) in Pakistan and by his fervent disciple Sayyid 
Qutb (1929-1966) in Egypt.  These two thinkers had a deep influence on today’s Islamist 
movement, in particular, on Ussama ben-Laden (Saudi Arabian) and his lieutenant in el 
                                                
34 From the very beginning of Saudi Arabia, the king was regarded as the guardian of Islam and the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina and was supposed to maintain Islamic values in the community and 
throughout the world (Nomani and Rahnema, pp. 137-140).  










qâ’ida, Ayman al-Zawahri (Egyptian).  While Mawdûdi did not call for war, even though his 
writings lead to the conclusion that war is required, Qutb claimoured for the reactivation of 
the jîhad and the use of sheer violence to achieve the aims of the movement.  For Mawdûdi, 
there is legitimacy in God only and the whole political realm must be reduced to the divine 
realm: the religious principle must be put back at the heart of social life with no room for 
anything else.  For Qutb, the Islamic society is one that accepted the sovereign authority of 
God and regarded the Qur’an as the source of all guidance for human life.  The struggle 
should aim at creating a universal Muslim society, thus marking the end of the Western world 
that cannot provide the values needed to support the new material civilization.  Against the 
moral decay of the Western civilization, Muslims must thus oppose an ethics reconstructed on 
the basis of Islam’s own origins.  It is only after having completely submitted to God, as God 
required, that man will be emancipated from all the servitudes of the present century.   
In Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim Brothers, an Islamist movement created by Hassan 
al-Banna (1906-1949), who was himself deeply influenced by his master, Rashid Ridha.  
Followers were to live according to the shari’a, purify their heart, and form the nucleus of 
dedicated fighters of the Islamic cause, which implies their readiness for violence and 
martyrdom (Hourani 1991, pp. 445-46, Meddeb 2002, pp. 114-15 and 121-22).  Qutb had a 
decisive influence on this movement and led it into open opposition to Nasser.  He was 
himself arrested, tried and executed in 1966.  The initial programme of the Islamists was thus 
to overthrow the corrupt regimes prevailing in Arab lands.  It is under peculiar circumstances, 
the refusal of the US government to honour its promise to remove its military bases from 
Saudi Arabia after the end of the Kuwait war, that ben-Laden decided to re-frame the 
priorities of el qâ’ida by targeting the United States and the Western world as the principal 
enemy. Since he brought with him most of the financial resources of the movement, other 
leaders such as al-Zawahri, had to give in, albeit reluctantly. 










 It is thus in continuous go-and-return movements from one bank of the Red Sea to the 
other that the first operational link between radical fundamentalism and Wahhabism was 
woven during the 1970s,  yet a second, far more critical conjunction of events was to happen 
in the early 1980s in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the very country where Mawdûdi 
propagated his ideology among his own brethern and in their own language (Meddeb 2002, p. 
122).  It bears noting that, even among the Mujahiddin who fought against the Soviet troops, 
there existed various contending factions with different sorts of Islamic creed.  They united 
together to oust the Soviet troops, yet tensions among them have always been serious and 
immediately resurfaced as soon as victory was obtained.  With the Russians out, Gulbuddin 
Hekhmatyar, the leader of the most extremist faction among the Mujahiddin,  became the 
prime minister of the Afghan government.35  Since internal confrontations between the 
contending factions of the victors did not stop, the government soon collapsed, and a new 
radical movement, that of the Taliban, came to power, quickly joined by the extremist 
Islamist factions of the Mujahiddin.  Like Ibn Hanbal twelve centuries earlier and like king 
Rahman toward the end of the 19th century (see above), the Taliban were convinced that a 
uniform, rigid interpretation of the Qur’an is the only way of bringing unity and restoring 
order among the feuding local tribes and warlords. 
We have still trodden only half of the way toward answering our first question since it 
remains to be explained why the puritanical interpretation of Islam has fallen on such 
compliant ears.  This query is particularly pertinent in the case of Egypt, traditionally one of 
the major sources of deep Muslim philosophical thinking and where the movement of the 
Muslim Brothers played a major role in spreading such a radical version of the faith.  
 
4.2 A modernization crisis compounded by military defeats 
                                                
35 Ironically enough, he was strongly supported and financed by the US (through the CIA), Pakistan (through the 
ISI, the Intelligence Service that rules Pakistan behind the screen), and Saudi Arabia 










What is it that recently caused the Islamic world to turn more radical?  The answer 
seems to be that radicalization of Islamic ideology is a consequence of a deep economic, 
social and military crisis faced by Muslim societies.  This crisis has its roots in the decline of 
the Arab civilization and its failure to meet the challenge of modernization posed by the 
Western world.  Thus, according to Mohamed Chérif Ferjani, the Arabs are torn between two 
models of civilization, the European civilization that challenges them and the Arab-Muslim 
civilization that provides them with a response to that challenge.  The choice between the two 
models is made especially difficult because of a “psychic tension” amplified by the acute 
awareness of the reality of decadence of the Arab world.  A fundamental trait of most 
contemporary political Arab writings, whether left- or right-oriented, is thus their “obsession 
with past grandeur” that prevents any strand of thought from envisaging progress, 
modernization and development in terms of a rupture with the past, such as happened with the 
Enlightenment Revolution in Europe.  Instead of ‘progress’, Arab authors prefer to think of a 
‘renaissance’ (“reviving the past grandeur”); that is, they prefer to think “in magical and 
mythical terms”: “It is as though the present and the future cannot have legitimacy if they are 
not rooted in the historical and cultural patrimony” (Ferjani 1991, pp. 133-34, my translation; 
see also Meddeb 2004).  Note that this analysis also applies to the deceptively secular 
ideology of Baathism in which “Arabism’s most basic model always resided in its own past”, 
and the consciousness of pan-Arabism has been ideologized in such a way as to borrow 
virtually nothing of the constellation of values associated with the European Enlightenment 
aside from an admiration for socialist economies (Makiya 1989, pp. 189-212).   
Other regions of the world have actually gone through such a modernization crisis 
(see, e.g., Janos 1982), and eventually succeeded in resolving it (think of the changes 
undergone by Japan while shifting from the Tokugawa to the Meiji era).  What makes the 
present predicament of the Muslim world, and the Arab world in particular, so persisting and 










vicious is the fact that it is sustained by humiliating military setbacks (which actually prolong 
a long tradition since the Arabs have gone from defeat to defeat since the victory of the 
Mongols over the Abbasids in 1258) and the openly declared support of the Western 
superpower in favour of a small-sized enemy embedded in the body of the Arab world.  In the 
words of Hourani,  
The events of 1967 [a crushing military defeat of the Egyptian Army at the hands of the 
Israelis], and the processes of change which followed them, made more intense that 
disturbance of spirits, that sense of a world gone wrong, which had already been expressed 
in the poetry of the 1950s and 1960s.  The defeat of 1967 was widely regarded as being 
not only a military setback but a kind of moral judgement.  If the Arabs had been defeated 
so quickly, completely and publicly, might it not be a sign that there was something rotten 
in their societies and in the moral system which they expressed?... the problem of identity 
was expressed in terms of the relationship between the heritage of the past and the needs 
of the present.  Should the Arab peoples tread a path marked out for them from outside, or 
could they find in their own inherited beliefs and culture those values which could give 
them a direction in the modern world? (pp. 442-43; see also Kassir 2004) 
 
To the extent that the first option appears as a surrender of independence to the 
external world, preference tends to be given to the second option.  In the words of Galal 
Amin, “To be healthy, their political and economic life should be derived from their own 
moral values, which themselves could have no basis except in religion” (quoted from 
Hourani, p. 443).  In the same vein, Pet r Mansfield wrote that after 1967 there was a sudden 
reversal of the common opinion that the Arabs were determined to catch up with the West’s 
material and technical progress; as a matter of fact, “secular Arab nationalism had been 
proved a failure and was dead; the masses would reject Western progress and turn to 
fundamentalist Islam as their only hope” (2003, p. 325; see also Dawisha,2003).  This 
fundamentalist Islam provides a kind of escape valve allowing political rulers to eschew 
reforms of their country’s economic and political system, an observation that dovetails with 
the above-reported finding of El Badawi and Makdisi that in Arab countries interstate 
conflicts and wars tend to promote authoritarianism rather than a shift toward democracy. 
All this is strangely reminiscent of the rebellion led against the Ottoman government 
in the early 17th century by young and idle students from religious schools.  Their leader was a 










gifted preacher, Kadizade Mehmed, whose sermons emphasized the evils of innovation: 
“every innovation is heresy, every heresy is error, and every error leads to hell” (quoted from 
Goffman 2002, p. 117).  In the words of Daniel Goffman, his followers considered the 
Ottoman military and high Ottoman society as “inept and morally bankrupt”, and they 
“envisioned the recurring debacles on the battlefield as well as the persistent palace scandals 
as manifestations of a turn away from true Islam”… In important ways, they constituted a 
forerunner to Islamic reformers in later centuries who, whether Ottoman, Egyptian, Wahhabi, 
or Iranian, consistently have argued that the West has defeated Islamic states only because 
their ostensibly Muslim leaders have forgotten their religious roots.  Bring back the 
Muhammedan state, they all argue, and Islam will again take up its leading rank in the world 
order” (p. 119). 
To whom does the new literal and puritanical Islam appeal most?  Not to the poorest 
of the poor, for whom Westernization is magical since it means an abundance of food and 
medicine, nor to the rural dwellers who are immersed in “a kind of village Islam that had 
adapted itself to local cultures and to normal human desires”, an Islam that is pluralistic and 
tolerant, allowing the worshipping of saints, the singing of religious hymns, or the cherishing 
of art, all activities formally disallowed in Islam (Zakaria 2003, p. 143).36  Religious and 
cultural syncretism was thus an hallmark of most rural societies in the lands of Islam (see 
above, Section 2).37  The people to whom Islam appeals most are “the educated hordes 
entering the cities of the Middle East or seeking education and jobs in the West” (Zakaria, p. 
144).  Also, being cut off from the ties of kinship and neighbourliness to which they were 
accustomed in their village, rural migrants found a sort of compensation in strong Muslim 
                                                
36 Revealingly, a recent study has shown that in Morocco rural women are more open than more 
educated urban women to the new Family Code, which contains provisions calling into question the 
traditional interpretation of the Islamic law regarding men-women relations (Aquil 2006). 
37 In Afghanistan, for example, the village mollah has no relation to the superior clergy: he is the 
employee of the village community in which he exercises the functions of a rite performer 
(Nahavandi, p. 86).   










urban organizations.  In other words, the sense of alienation or loss of identity which they 
experienced in the cities “could be counterbalanced by that of belonging to a universal 
community of Islam,…and this provided a language in terms of which they could express 
their grievances and aspirations” (Hourani, p. 452; see also Roy 2004, pp. 269-70).38 
Identification with Islamist groups among alienated urban people has been further 
aided by the fact that in many countries Islamist movements were able to capitalize on the 
lack of legitimacy of poorly performing states and their failure to integrate the entire 
population and to increase political participation (many regimes have had only narrow support 
within particular ethnic, religious or tribal minority groups).  They have also filled the gap left 
by the retreat of the state from the distribution of essential services, such as health, education, 
and childcare.  In Egypt, for example, the number of Muslim NGOs increased from 600 in the 
early 1970s to 2,000 in the mid-1980s, and the number of private mosques grew from 14,000 
to 40,000 from the early 1960s to the early 1980s (Huuhtanen 2005, pp. 78-79; see also Harik 
2005 for a detailed review of the Hezbollah’s social activities in Lebanon).  Typically, a 
privately-funded Islamic charitable institution provides a range of services that are organized 
around a private mosque, including donations for the poor, a clinic for health care, a 
kindergarten and a primary school.  Often, these institutions have also founded religious 
schools, orphanages, and homes for the elderly. 
In certain contexts, it must be noted, Islamist doctrines are used by middle class people 
who want to oppose social groups considered to enjoy undue privileges owing to their tight 
connection to the regime.  In Syria, for example, the Muslim Brothers did not have the same 
                                                
38 Naipaul’s account of Malaysia and Indonesia goes very much in the same direction.  For him, 
indeed, the problem is that people are cut off from their native rural communities whose customs are 
the outcome of subtle blending of pagan, archaic rites (or Hindu ones) with Islamic tenets, that is, 
Islam adapted to everyday village realities.  Lacking solid landmarks in their new urban, modern life, 
rural migrants face the threat of a loss of identity.  It is in Islam, and in the life of the mosque, with its 
rules and rituals, that “they found again, or reconstructed, something like the old feudal or rural 
community that for them no longer existed”.  After having been exposed to radical Islamic teaching, 
these new urban dwellers want to purify their native villages, which means cleansing them of pagan 
(and Hindu) customs (Naipaul, pp. 369, 387). 










role as those in Egypt: to a great extent they served as a medium for the opposition of the 
Sunni urban population to the domination of a regime identified with the Alawi community 
(Hourani, pp. 457).  In the Côte d’Ivoire, the rise of Wahhabism occurred during a period of 
increasing disruption of the traditional society under conditions of quickly growing 
urbanization and migration movements after the second world war.  The Wahhabite doctrine 
attracted rich merchants to whom it supplied an ideology that was both anti-establishment and 
‘bourgeois’.  It was anti-establishment in the sense of being opposed to the feudal-like elite of 
the marabouts, who are at the heart of traditional Islam but are viewed as impostors 
illegitimately interposing between God and the faithful,  and it was ‘bourgeois’ in the sense of 
being emancipated from the constraints of the traditional aristocratic system (Miran 2006, p. 
250).  It is true that its egalitarian discourse also appealed to low caste people willing to 
liberate themselves from the yoke of the traditional system of hierarchy, but it is only in the 
1980s that it started recruiting the urban poor.  For them, Wahhabism offered a partial 
response to their quest for social protection and spiritual advice in a context of urban 
economic precariousness (Miran, p. 285).39  What bears most emphasis is that behind the 
screen of religious antagonisms lay genuine social and political conflicts: 
[T]he battleground was less religious and doctrinal than social and political.  As a 
matter of fact, the recourse to the religious sphere through Wahhabite sectarianism 
allowed dissatisfied people to express differences that could not be overtly declared 
in the political realm.  Accusations of intolerance, dogmatism and narrow-
mindedness against the Wahhabites were therefore partly correct: since their 
separatism was grounded elsewhere, no discussion of a doctrinal nature was possible 
and no practical compromise could be reached with traditionalist Muslims. (Miran, 
p. 259, my translation). 
 
According to the same logic, educated and urbanized women wearing the Islamic veil 
may do so as a manner of escaping traditional norms that control their physical movements 
outside the family space.  By manifesting their belief in a pure Islam, they claim the right to 
                                                
39 Until political liberalization began in 1969, Houphouët-Boigny’s authoritarian rule succeeded in 
suppressing the Wahhabite movement rather effectively.   










relate directly to God and to dispense with the need to follow repressive rules enforced by 
men in the name of Islam, thereby obtaining access to public life: the wearing of the veil is 
“the sign of submission to God and not to men” (Boubekeur 2004, p. 151; see also Adelkhah 
1991, Göle 1993).  The very fact that the veil allows them to conceal more fully their body 
provides an astute rebuttal of the argument according to which women’s free movements in 
the outside space threaten the honour of the whole family.  As a final example of the 
importance of the socio-economic context for a proper understanding of the precise meaning 
of Islamist movements, it is worth remembering the peculiarity of the Iranian case.  In this 
country, responsiveness of certain powerful social classes, including business people, to 
appeals expressed in religious language is particularly strong because in the country’s history, 
there was a religious leadership able to act as a rallying point for all movements of opposition: 
relatively independent of the government, and generally respected for its piety and learning, it 
had always acted “as the spokesman of the collective consciousness” (Hourani, pp. 457-58).   
To sum up, in a situation of protracted crisis such as that experienced by the Muslim 
world, a radicalization of religious beliefs has taken place at the urging of frustrated urban 
groups and, as we have seen earlier, often by political rulers themselves.  Radicalization is 
more tempting when people can associate the failure of their governments in meeting the 
challenges of modernity with the failure of secularism and the Western path (most notably in 
Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Iraq where socialism, nationalism and secularism were the dominant 
ideologies of the post-independence ruling elites) and when military defeats are added to 
disappointing economic performances, corruption and inefficiency of the rulers.  In the 
process, the achievements of Arab secularism in the field of education and legal development 
(civil and commercial laws were made secular early on, toward the end of 19th century, in 
countries like Egypt and Syria), for example, are ignored or, worse, they are considered to be 
a liability.  An important outcome of the perceived failure of secularism is that Islam has little 










competition when it comes to articulate popular opposition to authoritarian and corrupt 
regimes.  In the words of Zakaria (pp. 142-143), 
The Arab world is a political desert with no real political parties, no free press, and few 
pathways to dissent.  As a result, the mosque became the place to discuss politics.  As the 
only place that cannot be banned in Muslim societies, it is where all the hate and 
opposition toward the regimes collected and grew.  The language of opposition became, in 
these lands, the language of religion.  This combination of religion and politics has proven 
to be combustible.  Religion, at least the religion of the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam), stresses moral absolutes.  But politics is all about compromise.  
The result has been a ruthless, winner-take-all attitude toward political life.  
Fundamentalist organizations have done more than talk.  From the Muslim Brotherhood to 
Hamas and Hizbullah, they actively provide social services, medical assistance, 
counseling, and temporary housing.  For those who treasure civil society, it is disturbing 
to see that in the Middle East these illiberal groups are civil society…  If there is one great 
cause of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, it is the total failure of political institutions in 
the Arab world. (see also Kassir 2004, p. 39, Hassan and Kivimäki 2005, p. 133).   
 
Islamist opposition is all the more intransigent as many Islamist teachers are rather 
poor thinkers prone to extreme simplification: self-proclaimed mollahs form an Islamic 
‘lumpen-intelligentsia’ made of ill-educated, ignorant people who misunderstand Islam owing 
to their lack of historical culture (Roy 1990, p. 73).40  In some places, important official 
positions can even be acceded by ill-trained people, such as in Faisalabad (Pakistan) where a 
qadi (islamic judge) can get his diploma, considered equivalent to a master in law, after a six-
week period (Piquard, p. 73).  A military despot, General Zia ul-Haq, conceded to the ulema 
(in exchange for their support) that the degrees awarded by the madrasas could be recognized 
as the equivalent of university degrees provided that some portions of the general curriculum 
were also taught in them (Zaman 2007, p. 78).  
We are now ready to address our last question: why have Islamic countries been rather 
ineffective, historically, in meeting the challenges of modern economic growth and, by way of 
consequence, in gradually moving toward a more secular approach to social order and the role 
of individuals in it? 
                                                
40 The young mollahs have passed sufficient time in the school system to consider themselves as 
educated persons and to refuse to go back to the land or enter into a factory, yet they have not 
succeeded in going beyond the secondary school (Roy, p. 73).  











5. Path dependence and the Islamic ‘institutional complex’ 
5.1 Statement of the problem 
Part of the answer to the above questions has already been suggested earlier.  
Emphasis was laid on the cost of reforming societies in which religion can be easily 
manipulated by political rulers and their contenders.  Moreover, as attested by the historical 
experience of Iran, middle class people may choose to ally themselves with religious leaders 
in order to achieve better protection against the predations of greedy state officials and the 
unfavourable policies of an incompetent and corrupt state.  In these conditions, it is difficult 
for progressive elements of society to call for reforms that religious authorities could consider 
impious or to resort to secular concepts and language in support of the desired changes.  What 
needs to be added now in light of the work of Kuran is that the legacy of the classical Islamic 
system may have given rise to an “institutional trap”, impeding both economic development 
and the rise of  civil society. 
 
5.2 The institutional trap inherited from the classical Islamic system  
According to Kuran, a direct consequence of the historical context in which Islam was 
born is that the Qur’an contains rules prescribing the rightful behaviour to follow in a number 
of civil matters (see above, Section 2).  In these matters that it addresses explicitly, the Qur’an 
carries an especially strong authority, a feature that is absent from Christianity, whose sacred 
texts are framed in general and allegorical terms.  Kuran focuses attention on a number of 
central institutions born of the classical Islamic system (whether based on the Qur’an or not)41 
that had the effect of blocking critical institutional changes, including in modern Turkey: the 
                                                
41  As noted by Kuran, the central economic institutions of the Middle East evolved over the three 
centuries following the ‘age of felicity’ (the period of Muhammad and his first four successors).  They 
were firmly in place around 1000 and were to persist up to the 19th century (Kuran 2004b, p. 72). 










Islamic law of commercial partnerships, which limited enterprise continuity and inter-
generational persistence; the Islamic inheritance system, which encouraged wealth 
fragmentation and restrained capital accumulation by creating incentives for keeping 
partnerships small; the waqf system, which inhibited resource pooling; and Islam’s traditional 
aversion to the concept of legal personhood, which hampered the emergence of private 
corporate organizations (Kuran 1997, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2005, and 
2006).  Critical among these institutions is the inheritance system (actually based on the 
Qur’an), which actually prevented the Islamic contract law to evolve as it has done in Western 
Europe where people found it relatively easy to modify inheritance practices in response to 
changing needs (since the Bible did not prescribe rules for transferring wealth across 
generations).   
As a result, a whole series of organizational changes that proved essential for the 
development of a modern economy did not arise in the Muslim lands.  The fact that from the 
late 18th century onward, the indigenous Christians and Jews came increasingly to dominate 
the most lucrative sectors of the Middle Eastern economy bears witness to the adverse role of 
Islamic institutions since, unlike the Muslims, members of these minorities were free to 
choose their law system (Kuran 2004c, Goffman 2002, p. 73).  At the start of the 20th century, 
as a result, almost all large commercial enterprises in the Middle East were owned by either 
foreigners or local religious minorities (Kuran 2004b, pp. 72 and 84-87, 2004c, Issawi 1971, 
pp. 67-69).  The example of Turkey is particularly interesting because the Islamic law was 
abrogated there when the Young Turks seized power from the Ottomans and accelerated the 
country’s move along the Westernizing secular path.  It thus shows that the lingering effect of 
erstwhile Islamic institutions inspired by the shari’a rather than the Islamic law itself may be 
the real stumbling block on the way to modern economic growth.  In this way, institutions that 
were adapted to the ruling economic conditions at the time of their emergence have proven a 










barrier at a more advanced stage of economic development, when Western societies had 
undergone basic transformations (Jones 1981, Landes 1998, Kuran 2004b, Greif 2006). 
Recently, Ghislaine Lydon has lent further support to Kuran’s thesis by arguing that a 
basic flaw in Islamic legal systems is their failure to invest paperwork with legal personality.  
Paradoxically, while Qur’anic verses placed great emphasis on the importance of writing and 
documenting credit transactions, written documents such as debt contracts and even fatwas 
had no value in and of themselves and could not therefore be used as legal evidence in a court 
of law.  This lack of faith in paper stemmed from the belief that documents can easily be 
tampered with or simply forged, whereas oral testimonies given under an oath by witnesses 
are quite reliable.  This limitation constituted a serious obstacle to the modern development of 
Muslim economies because it inhibited the growth of ‘paper companies’, such as joint-stock 
companies or corporations as well as the development of complex and large-scale enterprise 
in commerce, industry, and the key sector of banking.42  
In contrast to the above, Maxime Rodinson (1966, p. 193) contends that Islamic 
rulings, such as fatwas, “represented a formality that was obtained without difficulty from 
accommodating theologians, in order to put in the clear religious opinion leaders who had 
already decided to adopt a certain measure for reasons that were strictly economic and 
political”.  He delves extensively into the case of the interest rate and argues that Islamic 
                                                
42 In another recent paper, Hania Abou al-Shamat (2007) examines the effects in Egypt of the legal 
reforms of 1883 that established native courts based on the Napoleon code of law to deal with civil, 
commercial and penal disputes.  All Egyptians, regardless of religion, had equal access to and 
representation in the courts, and documentation requirements were incorporated into the system 
(written documents could be used as evidence in legal proceedings).  The author finds that it is only 
more than a third of a century after the legal changes were made that national business interests 
responded to them by creating large enterprises and increasing investment in the industrial and 
banking sectors.  She mentions a number of reasons for this delayed response, including poor 
enforcement of the new laws by the native courts, the shortage of qualified Egyptian judges and 
lawyers to serve in them, low trust of Egyptians in the mixed courts competent to deal with cases 
involving both indigenous and foreign interests, and unfair competition from foreign countries (under 
the capitulations, foreigners enjoyed lower tariffs and exemption from taxes).  She concludes, rather 
sensibly, that reform in law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of new 
business forms and increased investment in Muslim countries.  










prohibitions in this matter have always been circumvented: interest was usually charged under 
forms considered legitimate, such as commissions or salaries (pp. 179-200).  If the argument 
is historically correct, the example is ill-chosen because Islamic law does not prescribe a 
penalty for dealing in interest and because, as pointed out by Rodinson himself, it aims at 
curbing excessive interest rates rather than prohibiting the practice altogether (p. 189).  In 
fact, the claim that Islam categorically prohibits all interest, regardless of form, purpose, or 
magnitude, on the grounds that it violates a sacred Islamic command has encountered strong 
resistance from the earliest days of Islam, and in all large communities Muslims have never 
stopped dealing in interest.43  In this, they were aided by the jurists of Islam who devised, as 
in European territories under Christian rule, stratagems that allowed people to circumvent 
Islam’s presumed interest ban without violating its letter (Kuran 2004b, p. 73).44   
  A number of important implications can be drawn from Kuran’s analysis.  First, 
reforming key institutions appears especially difficult in the lands of Islam because they are 
part of a legacy anchored in sacred texts or in the sacralized period of the caliphate.  The only 
way to modify or replace these institutions is to propose a new interpretation of the Islamic 
law, which would require quite a strong authority.  Such a move has actually taken place in a 
few countries recently, yet interestingly, it was initiated by an enlightened despot in the 
absence of real pressures from the civil society.  In Morocco and Tunisia, autocratic rulers 
have, indeed, succeeded in holding traditionalist religious forces in check and enacting  
                                                
43 In Iran, for instance, around 1850 interest rates averaged 12.50 percent but could vary between 18-
30 percent when money became scarce (Issawi).  Under the Safavids, the ulemas themselves 
developed various subterfuges to make commercial habits compatible with Islamic precepts, 
particularly in the matter of interest rates (Floor, 2000).  
44 Revealingly, it is only with the present-day radicalization of Islam that we observe an energetic 
campaign against conventional banking in countries formally committed to Islamization (Kuran 
2004a, p. 122).  In these countries, indeed, Islamic banks have emerged through efforts aiming at 
differentiating the ‘Islamic way of life’ from other lifestyles, particularly from those identified with the 
West.  Muslim piety is thus increasingly regarded as involving the shunning of interest. It bears noting 
that, in countries where Islamic banks coexist with conventional banks and where people have the 
freedom to choose between them, only a minority of the Muslim population maintains accounts at 
Islamic banks: the market share of the latter is a tiny 1% (Kuran 2004a, p. 123; see also Rahnema and 
Nomani 1990, Kuran 1998, Tripp 2006). 










progressive legislations dealing with personal and family matters.  The case of Tunisia is 
particularly interesting because the new code of personal statute, enacted immediately after 
national independence (in August 1956), is remarkably progressive (e.g., the practices of 
polygamy and repudiation are forbidden).45  It was essentially the work of President 
Bourguiba, who was eager to legitimize his project of social and political reforms by referring 
to a modernized version of the discourse of Islam, stressing the need for a new ijtihad and the 
role of reason in interpreting Islamic laws and prescriptions46.  According to him, indeed, the 
main cause of the backwardness of the Muslims during centuries of protracted decadence lay 
in their refusal to accept the necessity of Reason and in their imprisonment in tradition and 
imitation (Camau and Geisser 2004). 
Second, we have already noted that in some countries a reform movement is hampered 
by a strong tradition of cooperation between middle class people (including merchants and 
businessmen) and religious scholars against the arbitrary rule of corrupt state officials.  The 
absence of key reforms then appears as the price that those people are willing to pay in order 
not to antagonize key allies in their struggle against tyranny.  What must be added now is that, 
even when there is no such strong alliance, a civil society able to push reforms and confront 
the state is hard to come by for reasons that have again to do with the legacy of traditional 
Islamic law.  According to Kuran, there are two main channels through which Islam exerted 
its adverse influence on political freedom.  For one thing, because the institution of the waqf 
benefited the economic elite (since they could thereby protect their wealth), it discouraged 
them from demanding the constitutional enforcement of private property rights.47  For another 
                                                
45  The same cannot be said about the 1984 family code of Algeria, which appears to uphold the 
traditional view of women within society and the family (Mitchell 1997).  
46 The concept of ijtihad points to the process through which a jurist apprehends God’s law and can 
turn it into a legal ruling. 
47 According to Kuran, the institution of the waqf itself was conceived as a device to shelter personal 
assets and enhance the material security of the high officials; it actually represented “an implicit 
bargain between rulers and their wealthy subjects” (Kuran 2006, pp. 799-802). 
 










thing, by preventing the emergence of large commercial enterprises, Islam made potential 
opposition to autocratic rule more fragmented and less effective (Kuran 2004b, pp. 80-83, and 
2006, pp. 819-23).  It is, therefore, no coincidence that the first parliament of the Middle East 
(the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul) was established only in 1876 and under Western 
influences (Kuran 2004b, pp. 82, 87). 
Third, because economic and political reforms did not occur owing to the peculiar 
legacy of Islam, modern values and ideas of the kind propounded by the European 
Enlightenment could not take strong roots in most of the lands of Islam (with the exception of 
Turkey).  True, by emphasizing the possibility of attaining the truth through the use of human 
reason as well as the need for liberty in the interpretation of the shari’a48, a number of 
thinkers and philosophers of Islam undoubtedly strode toward a kind of European 
Enlightenment; think of Roumi and Yünüs Emre (the Sufist Spinoza) in Turkey, Avicenna 
(Ibn Sina) and Sorawardi in Persia, or (Ibn Rushd) Averroes in Andalus.  However, even 
among progressive philosophers, the ultimate reference to God and the divine world has never 
been abandoned,49 and in any event, the momentum that they initiated was not strong enough 
to alter in a durable manner the traditionalist perceptions about the role of religion in social 
and political life.50   
 
5.3 A qualifying remark 
                                                
48 Averroes thus believed that not all the words of the Qur’an should be taken literally: “When the 
literal meaning of Qur’anic verses appeared to contradict the truths to which philosophers arrived by 
the exercise of reason, those verses needed to be interpreted metaphorically” (Hourani, p. 175). 
49 For Averroes, for example, if there is no incompatibility between faith and human reason since the 
latter remains inspired by God. 
50 The persisting need to refer to God in the Islamic world is apparent not only in the writings of 
progressive philosophers, but also in those of economic thinkers.  For example, ‘authentic’ economic 
Shi’ite writers maintain that private ownership of the means of production is respectable, that rent and 
profit are legitimate pursuits, that trade and commerce are to be encouraged, and that the market is 
“the basic economic institution for the provision of the needs of the Islamic community”.  However, 
their vision is that of a religious system the objective of which is “to serve God on earth”.  Therefore, 
the above-mentioned institutions and processes “must be structured according to and operate within 
the framework of the Shari’a” (Rahmena and Nomani 1990, p. 160; see also Haenni 2005). 










Kuran has stressed that it is only a few, but admittedly critical institutional legacies of 
the classical Islamic system that are problematic for modern economic growth.  In many 
matters, especially in economic matters, the Islamic principles, whether contained in the 
Qur’an or in the Hadith, are stated so vaguely or so ambiguously that they can be interpreted 
in many diverse ways (Kuran 2004d).    In matters of inheritance, however, the statements are 
extremely precise (see Sura IV “About women”, verses 7-176), and this inflexibility has 
caused Islamic contract law to freeze.  It must now be pointed out that, even in these matters, 
the manner in which the Islamic law is interpreted and enforced depends to a large extent 
upon the prevailing configuration of social and political forces, including the degree to which 
a society has absorbed Islamic tenets and the context of historical constraints and 
opportunities.   
Thus, in old Islamized communities of rural West Africa and some regions of the 
Maghreb (e.g., in Kabylia, Algeria, or among the Berbers in Morocco), it is the erstwhile 
custom rather than the Islamic inheritance law that tends to be enforced.  In the Juula and 
Hausa lands, clerical specialists did not always demand strict religious adherence on the part 
of the local lay Muslim community.  In particular, descent rules could be manipulated to 
avoid dispersion of business assets by selecting one unique successor among slaves/clients 
(rather than relatives) recruited into the trading organization as junior partners.  In fact, 
specific arrangements “depended almost entirely upon arrangements made within a modified 
version of the secular kinship idiom” (Austen 1987, pp. 43-44).  The major social function of 
Islam, in these territories, was “to provide merchants with an identity which reinforced their 
occupational role”, allowing them to act as “representatives of a cult that had material and 










spiritual connections to a universe larger than the parochial world of local villages, or even 
savanna empires” (Austen, pp. 42-43).51 
In northern Senegal, Islamization dates back to the colonisation of the (middle) valley 
of the Senegal river by successive waves of foreign conquerors since the 10th century, and 
maraboutic power used the 1776 revolution to assert itself and establish the Almaami regime 
based on the Islamic law (Minvielle 1977).  My own field investigations in the area showed 
that the Qur’anic prescriptions regarding inheritance are well-known by local rural inhabitants 
who often refer to them as the rules governing the behaviour of Muslims.  When their actual 
behaviour of rule-breaking is pointed out to them (since they tend to follow the custom 
according to which women do not inherit land), they feel somewhat embarrassed.  They are 
keen to remark that (i) nothing prevents a woman from calling the local marabout and 
requiring the enforcement of the Islamic norm, and (ii) daughters often receive some sort of 
compensation from their brothers (e.g., under the form of harvest shares).52   
In general, it can be confidently asserted that the Islam of the villages is rather flexible 
compared to the more tightly controlled Islam of the cities.  It is actually in cities that 
puritanical expressions such as found in Islamist movements have been born, and it is in cities 
(and in rural areas nearby) that strict interpretations of Islam hold sway.  Since modern 
economic growth is typically anchored in urban environments, the institutional flexibility of 
“village Islam” is of not much help when the problem is to develop sophisticated forms of 
economic organizations.   
 It is true that, even in cities, Islamic rulings can be circumvented, yet there are costs 
involved, and those costs are higher if a puritanical atmosphere prevails.  Changes in 
                                                
51 In the words of Aboubacar Fofana, an influential reformist Muslim cleric of Côte d’Ivoire, “what 
matters is not where an individual comes from, but what he or she does”.  Muslim brotherhoods put 
emphasis on personal merits and engagement, not on social status and ethnic identity: they are based 
on elective membership (Miran, pp. 450, 472-73). 
52 For a similar observation in Niger, see Cooper (1997), and see Bedoucha (1987) for another 
illustration of the flexible interpretation of the Qur’anic inheritance law among the Tuaregs, based on a 
subtle blending of written tenets, oral tradition and tacit understanding. 










institutions may occur through surreptitious modifications, lengthy negotiations and casuistry, 
legal fictions, exploitation of ambiguities, and corruption of rule enforcers.  The Islamic 
prohibition of innovations (bid’a) offers a good illustration.  The systematic prohibition of all 
techniques and practices differing from those prevailing in the times of the Prophet has been 
quickly abandoned, and the distinction, introduced in the Middle Ages, between what 
constitute ‘good’ and ‘bad’ innovations was a useful compromise enabling rulers and scholars 
to escape absurd situations (Rodinson, pp. 180-81).  The fact remains, however, that the 
notion of harmful innovations has persisted and can be potentially used by conservative ulema 
to block useful changes or increase their cost.  For instance, upon the request of Abdul Aziz, 
king of Saudi Arabia, ulema close to him had to exert themselves to find in the sacred texts a 
proper justification for an innovation as fundamental as photography.  This innovation was 
eventually accepted, despite the idolatry of pictorial art, on the ground that it brings together 
light and shadow, which are both divine creations (Nomani and Rahnema, p. 139).  In most 
other Arab countries where such a puritanical atmosphere did not prevail, the transaction costs 
involved in constructing a religious justification of photography could be saved.53 
Furthermore, when changes are brought through essentially illegal practices, pressures 
for fundamental institutional reform are reduced, and vast constituencies with a vested interest 
in the status quo are generated (Kuran 2003, pp. 428-31, and 2004b, p. 81).54  Thus, centuries 
of efforts to overcome the inflexibility of institutions such as the waqf system have bred a 
                                                
53 Another interesting illustration of both the ingenuity of the jurists in adapting the Islamic law (in this 
case, the absence of recognition of human groups as legal entities and the Hanafi law of inheritance;  
inheritance is not confined to direct descendants, and each heir has a canonical right to a fixed share of 
the deceased’s property) and the ultimate constraints set by it has been provided by Kermeli (1997) 
while dealing with the treatment meted out to church waqfs under the Ottoman empire.  By re-defining 
the monks of a monastery as a family, Ebu’s Su’ud (who became seyhulislam in 1545) recognized 
their collectivity and enabled them to receive the property belonging to a deceased monk (since they 
were considered as his offspring).  However, he ordered them to make waqfs in their own names, not 
in the name of the monastery since monastic waqfs were not permitted in Islamic law.  Realizing the 
pitfalls of this legal fiction used for the benefit of the monks of Mount Athos, Ebu’s Su’ud quickly 
issued a fatwa restricting similar claims from other monasteries.  
54 In the words of Kuran, “to identify opportunities for circumventing a law is not to establish that 
law’s irrelevance or to prove that the opportunities were available to everyone” ( 2003, p. 430).  










culture of corruption and nepotism in state circles.  This, in conjunction with the deep-rooted 
habit of personalizing exchanges and attributing responsibility for an adverse externality to a 
natural person or group rather than to a legal person, makes the establishment of the rule of 
law the hard challenge that it is in the Middle East today (Kuran 2004b, pp. 86-87).   
 
6.   Conclusion 
In the light of historical evidence, it is hard to claim that politics and Islam have been 
systematically merged together or that politics has been the handmaiden of Islam.  In ordinary 
times, even after the legal community of Islamic scholars (judges, teachers, legal advisers and 
jurisconsults) had been set firmly in place during the early Abbasids, political rulers have had 
the upper hand, much as in Western European history.  Religious authorities and groups 
typically played the role of a buffer between the state and the people, often providing shelter 
against the ruler’s abuses and acting as a mediator to encourage negotiation with political 
opponents.  In times of crisis, however, when the state was either impotent or excessively 
tyrannical, such politico-religious equilibrium was broken and religion gained greater 
significance.  In addition, the growing role of religion could also be the result of a strategy of 
political instrumentalization whereby the political ruler used his Islamic credentials to tame 
opposition and crush dissent. 
Lewis thus appears to have the wrong diagnosis when he contends that the root cause 
of the existence of illiberal regimes in Middle Eastern countries lies in politics being the 
handmaiden of Islam when the opposite appears to be much closer to the truth.  Moreover, he 
does not explain satisfactorily (unless one is convinced by his argument about the critical 
moment of the foundation of the faith) why the separation between state and religion has not 
occurred some time in its history, as has happened in Western Europe.  This lapse is not 










coincidental since Lewis is convinced that the merging of state and religion is an intrinsic 
feature of Islam; that is, a situation that cannot be remedied. 
According to Timur Kuran and Avner Greif, a critical obstacle to essential economic 
and political reforms and, it can be added, to changes in ideas and values that would justify 
the need for an autonomous sphere of economic activity unimpeded by political and religious 
restrictions, lies in some elements of the ‘institutional complex’ inherited from the classical 
system of Islam.  They have caused the emergence of institutional traps at the time when 
Western Europe was making rapid and sustained advances on the basis of critical institutional 
innovations.  A legacy of the Islamic civilization, which was well suited for progress until the 
advent of modern times, thus came to hamper economic achievements rivalling those of 
Western Europe.   
If we follow such a dynamic approach to the present crisis of Islamic societies, we 
have to admit that culture in general, and religion in particular, can be an impediment to 
progress.  By way of consequence, stressing that religion is often instrumentalized by key 
political players does not imply that it may not hinder the modernization of a country; there is, 
indeed, a core institutional legacy of Islam that sets an ultimate set of constraints upon the 
range of feasible policies and reforms.  Maxime Rodinson and Fareed Zakaria have argued 
that religion, because it is easily manipulated by political actors, does not constitute an 
autonomous force that is, by itself, susceptible of promoting or retarding economic growth 
and development.  As a result, the notion that “the key is not religious reform, but political 
and economic reform…if you get the politics and economics right, culture will follow” 
(Zakaria, p. 150) is too simple.  
Even if one disagrees with the theory of the “institutional trap” propounded by Kuran 
(and Greif), there remains the fact that, in Islam, no clear chain of command exists that is able 
to enforce a strict, uniform interpretation of the message of the faith.  The consequence of this 










situation is that socio-religious movements eager to block progress toward individual 
emancipation have numerous possibilities open to them and elites are provided with a rather 
cheap default option whereby they can escape the effects of their misrule and suppress 
political opposition.  A nasty obscurantist deadlock may thus be created in which puritanical 
interpretations of Islam, claiming that the letter rather than the spirit of the Qur’an must be 
followed, as well as mythical appraisals of early achievements of the Islamic civilization 
emerge and gain ground. 
The central question then arises as to how politics can be made right in such 
conditions.  In particular, given the high costs and risks of undertaking reforms necessary for 
effective competition with advanced countries in the modern age, how can more democratic 
institutions be established, and how can political integration be achieved without reference to 
Islam?  The task is all the more daunting as international events have considerably increased 
the temptation to instrumentalize Islam for rulers who have suffered a series of humiliating 
defeats or setbacks at the hands of advanced countries that often had a poor understanding of 
and paid insufficient attention to Arab interests and problems.  Had the Western powers taken 
a more enlightened route earlier in dealing with the Palestinian question, perhaps the nascent 
Arab secular movements in the fifties and the sixties would have been given a better 
opportunity to take roots.  Given such highly explosive circumstances prevailing in the 
Middle East today, it is perhaps not coincidental that enlightened despots (such as Ataturk or 
Bourguiba), determined to embark upon a new interpretation of the Islamic law that would 
leave ample room for the role of reason, might appear as holding the best prospects for 
breaking out of the obscurantist deadlock.  If such an implication is correct, those advanced 
countries that proclaim their willingness to promote democracy in this part of the world are 
confronted with a strange paradox over which they should ponder.  










There are obviously complex interactions and feedback effects between culture and 
institutional change that are too much ignored by both Lewis and Zakaria.  When they are 
taken into account, a basic contrast emerges between the virtuous development trajectory of 
Western Europe in modern times and the vicious path trodden by Islamic countries.   Whereas 
in the former countries institutional and ideological changes have reinforced each other in a 
beneficial manner, deriving much of their strength from more or less continuous 
improvements in living standards, in the latter economic performances and social progress 
have remained hampered by a long tradition of despotism and insufficient competitiveness 
with the advanced part of the Western world, coupled with an adverse international 
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